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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion  
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. 
—Justice Robert H. Jackson1 
Exceptions to the First Amendment are often built 
on the backs of the powerless and the despised. 
—Ken White, free speech attorney and commentator2 
1 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
2 Fighting Words, MAKE NO LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT PODCAST (Jan. 31, 2018) 
(downloaded using iTunes). 
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Doesn’t matter what the press says. Doesn’t matter what the 
politicians or the mobs say. Doesn’t matter if the whole country 
decides that something wrong is something right. . . .  
When the mob and the press and the whole world tell you to move, 
your job is to plant yourself like a tree beside the river of truth, 
and tell the whole world, “No, you move.” 
—Steve Rogers, (a.k.a. Captain America)3 
It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment 
as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian 
government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history 
since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their 
attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons onward  
as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech 
for the generations to come. 
—Justice Anthony Kennedy4 
INTRODUCTION 
acial tensions are rising in the United States, with no signs of 
abating anytime soon.5 The tragic number of African American 
deaths resulting from euphemistically titled “officer-involved 
shootings”6 has dramatically increased in the last decade, which has 
spurred heated, sometimes violent, protests.7 In addition, police 
departments nationwide are grappling with increased threats to 
officers’ safety.8 Social media platforms add fuel to the fire because 
3 J. Michael Straczynski, The War at Home: Part 6 of 7, THE AMAZING SPIDER-MAN 
CIVIL WAR, 2012, at 15. 
4 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
5 See Art Swift, Americans’ Worries About Race Relations at Record High, GALLUP 
(Mar. 15, 2017), http://bit.ly/2NZcAhL (noting that the percentage of Americans who worry 
a “great deal” about race relations has risen since 2010). 
6 Radley Balko, The Curious Grammar of Police Shootings, WASH. POST (July 14, 
2014), https://wapo.st/2NZ2HQW. 
7 See, e.g., F. Brinley Bruton, et al., Dallas Police “Ambush”: 12 Officers Shot, 5 Killed 
During Protest, NBC NEWS, https://nbcnews.to/2TB9d6E (last updated July 8, 2016). 
8 See, e.g., Max Kutner, Police Departments Issuing Safety Precautions After Baton 
Rouge, Dallas, NEWSWEEK (July 18, 2016, 4:09 PM), http://bit.ly/2O0Ji1Z; Rich Morin, et 
al., Behind the Badge, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://pewrsr.ch/2O5wJTm 
(finding that ninety-three percent of police officers have become more fearful for their safety 
following a rise in high profile incidents involving officers and black individuals); cf. Lisa 
Desjardins, The History of U.S. Police Deaths in the Line of Duty, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 8, 
R 
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they enable nearly instantaneous, bidirectional transmission of both 
accurate and inaccurate information around the globe. Accordingly, 
many municipalities have implemented restrictive social media 
policies for both the public and government employees.9 Firing a 
government employee for violating such a social media policy in his or 
her use of digital communications tools, however, especially when the 
employee does so on his or her own time, raises stark questions 
regarding whether and to what extent the policy violates the First 
Amendment. 
Government employers, like their private-sector counterparts, have 
several legitimate interests in distancing themselves from an 
employee’s opinion, especially when an employee’s opinion is 
discriminatory. For example, employers have an interest in shielding 
other employees from hostile work environments and protecting 
themselves from liability for a hostile work environment. Under 
judicial interpretations of Title VII’s language, the standard of proof in 
a claim alleging a hostile work environment is mere constructive 
knowledge, and an employer’s safe harbors under applicable 
regulations are narrow.10 This legal regime can encourage swift 
termination actions when a subordinate employee’s conduct 
discriminates against another subordinate employee. 
Municipalities, in particular, have a compelling interest in regulating 
police officers’ speech. Repugnant police officer views, if published, 
could ostensibly interfere with a police department’s ability to 
effectively or efficiently deliver public safety services to the city.11 The 
2016, 8:22 AM), https://to.pbs.org/2O3BBrV (noting that shooting deaths of officers have 
recently risen). But see Officer Deaths by Year, NAT’L L. ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
MEMORIAL FUND, http://bit.ly/2O0jC5G (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) (noting that actual 
fatalities peaked during the Prohibition Era but have since halved). 
9 See, e.g., CITY OF W. HOLLYWOOD COMMC’NS DEP’T, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY (2016), 
http://bit.ly/2O0jDXk; CITY OF SEATTLE SOCIAL MEDIA USE POLICY (2009), 
http://bit.ly/2O2tyf5; Wiley Hayes, Social Media Policies Installed by Some Municipalities; 
Commissioners Resist, CARROLL COUNTY TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015, 10:03 PM), 
http://bit.ly/2O2jh2l; Ashley Stewart, Blooming Prairie, Medford Adopt Social Media Use 
Policies, BPLEADER.COM (May 19, 2017), http://bit.ly/2O0JDSj; San Francisco Police 
Department Social Media Policy, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., http://bit.ly/2O0jK5c (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2019); Social Media Policy, HINGHAM POLICE DEP’T, 
http://bit.ly/2O2eON2 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019); Kathleen O’Toole, Chief O’Toole 
Announces New Social Media Policy, SEATTLE.GOV (Feb. 20, 2015, 2:36 PM), 
http://bit.ly/2Fa4e3Z; Niles Police Department Social Media Policy, VILLAGE OF NILES, 
http://bit.ly/2F7Rlar (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
10 See infra Part IV Section E.2. 
11 David L. Hudson, Jr., Public Employees, Private Speech: 1st Amendment Doesn’t 
Always Protect Government Workers, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2017, 4:10 AM), 
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law must balance the city’s compelling interests in public safety, 
however, with a police officer’s right to free speech. The rapidly 
evolving pace of technological advances that enable instantaneous 
social media communication, and create records of online speech, 
exacerbate the need for an accurate balance. For example, Nashville, 
Tennessee, recently fired a police officer for making a comment on his 
personal social media account, while he was off duty, about the fatal 
police shooting of an African American man in Minnesota.12 In the 
context of the current national conversation on how police officers’ 
uses of force disproportionately affect racial minorities, the officer’s 
Facebook comment was racially insensitive. Despite the controversial 
connotation of his comment, this episode raises issues surrounding a 
police officer’s speech rights in today’s social media–driven 
information ecosystem. Specifically, this officer’s firing demonstrates 
the need for new contours in civil rights law governing public 
employees’ exercises of free speech rights. 
Traditionally, if a jurisdiction bases a law, rule, or policy that 
restricts speech on the basis of its content, a reviewing court will 
subject the rule to strict scrutiny. For the restriction to pass muster, the 
government entity must demonstrate both that it has a compelling 
interest in encroaching on the speaker’s freedom and that the rule is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s purpose. This is a high 
bar that is difficult for government defendants to satisfy. A different set 
of rules apply, however, when a government body acts as an employer, 
rather than a sovereign. A gap exists in the prevailing standards of civil 
rights law that govern alleged public employment retaliations against 
culturally abhorrent or politically disfavored speech. 
What happens when nobody may have known about a police 
officer’s controversial speech if the government had not published it, 
or republished it, on a scale and with tools sufficient to foment public 
outrage in a very short period of time? Current federal law provides no 
answer. Specifically, § 1983 jurisprudence, as currently conceived, 
does not account for potential First Amendment violations that result 
when a municipality publicizes or amplifies a police officer’s offensive 
speech that the public may never have known about but for the 
municipality publishing or amplifying it, and then fires the officer as a 
http://bit.ly/2F9cxwP (“[F]irst responders . . . require the public’s complete trust that they 
will discharge their duties faithfully and impartially without regard to factors like a person’s 
race, gender or sexual orientation.”); see also infra Part IV Section E.3. 
12 See infra Part I. 
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result of public outrage. Although § 1983 jurisprudence allows 
municipal employers to override First Amendment protections and fire 
subordinate employees for offensive speech in certain situations, the 
current framework does not address whether the Constitution permits 
this overriding when the employer, rather than the employee, publicizes 
the speech. This uncertainty risks chilling debate on salient topics and 
exposing public employees to the threat of wrongful infringements on 
their constitutional rights to free speech. The lack of predictability will 
continue to pose challenges as information markets continue to change 
and become more dynamic through technological progress. There is 
virtually no limiting principle in the current law that prevents municipal 
employers from violating their employees’ speech rights under the 
guise of mitigating a hostile work environment, preventing disruptions 
to public services, or any other number of justifications they might 
invoke to defend censorious social media policies when the employer 
amplifies the offending speech. 
Against this backdrop, this Article proceeds by first recounting in 
Part I the tale of former Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County 
(Metro) Police Officer Anthony Venable (Venable), whom the city 
fired in 2017 for comments he posted on Facebook, when he was off 
duty, about a fatal police shooting (Venable Case). Part II discusses 
§ 1983 and sets forth free speech case law that governs public
employment retaliation claims pursuant to the statute. Part III returns
to the Venable Case and applies current law to demonstrate the failure
of the prevailing retaliation framework to address government-
manufactured public opinion crises. Next, Part IV sketches a new rule
(Venable Rule) that courts should use in analogous cases. Simply put,
taking into account the changing nature of the global information
ecosystem and evolving speech paradigms in the digital age, and the
primacy of protecting speech in American constitutional law, the
Venable Rule first requires proof that controversial speech actually
disrupted the efficient delivery of public services. Second, the Venable
Rule requires that a terminated public employee has an opportunity to
rebut a government employer’s evidence of an actual disruption with
his or her own proof that the government’s republication of the speech,
as opposed to the initial utterance, caused the disruption. This Part also
provides practical and theoretical justifications for the Venable Rule,
further demonstrating how it balances the weighty interests of the
speaker, the public employer, and society at large, and better comports
with due process of law than the status quo. Part IV additionally
explores how the Venable Rule might apply outside the § 1983 context.
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I 
FIRING ANTHONY VENABLE 
Until recently, Venable was, by all official accounts, a model 
policeman. He received the Field Operations Bureau Police Officer of 
the Year award in 2014 for his “steady work ethic” and “significant 
arrests” of felony criminals.13 But two years later, on July 7, 2016, 
Metro Police Chief Steve Anderson (Chief Anderson) decommissioned 
Venable “pending the results of an internal investigation into a post 
[Venable] made from his personal Facebook account.”14 Venable 
commented on a video of a fatal police shooting of Philando Castile, 
an African American man. In the video, a Falcon Heights, Minnesota, 
police officer shot Castile four times and killed him.15 In response to 
other comments on the post, Venable wrote, “I would have done 5,” 
referring to the four shots that the Falcon Heights officer fired at 
Castile.16 Venable’s insensitive remark was highly controversial in 
light of growing racial tensions across the country arising from concern 
over the racial disparity in the use of lethal force in police encounters. 
When his superiors asked him about his conduct, Venable 
maintained that he was replying sarcastically to an online acquaintance 
who had posted the video.17 Chief Anderson, however, stated in a city 
press release (Venable Decommissioned Release) that the police 
department “treat[ed] this matter very seriously and took immediate 
action, regardless of what [Venable] claim[ed] the context to have 
been.”18 Within a week, news of Metro’s investigation into the Venable 
Case quickly spread.19 
13 METRO. NASHVILLE POLICE DEP’T, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2014), 
http://bit.ly/2Faag4M. Venable received this commendation for, among other things, 
arresting a suspect wanted for involvement in child rape, a convicted felon in possession of 
cocaine, and a marijuana dealer. Id. 
14 Press Release, Officer Anthony Venable Decommissioned; Under Investigation for 
Facebook Post, METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN. (July 7, 
2016), http://bit.ly/2TCv4uv [hereinafter Venable Decommissioned]. 
15 See Police Fatally Shoot Man During Traffic Stop, Aftermath Video Posted, CBS 
MINN. (July 6, 2016, 11:12 PM), https://cbsloc.al/2FbJau1. 
16 Venable Decommissioned, supra note 14. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See, e.g., Ariana Maia Sawyer, Nashville Police Chief Orders Officer 
Decommissioned After Facebook Post, TENNESSEAN (July 7, 2016, 10:26 p.m.), 
http://bit.ly/2F7Tsdt; see also Crystal Bonvillian, Nashville Officer Decommissioned 
Following Facebook Post About Philando Castile Shooting, AL.COM (July 8, 2016, 12:04 
PM), http://bit.ly/2EZenz5 (updated July 8, 2016, 12:04 PM); Jessica Chia, “I Would Have 
484 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 477 
Seven months later, Metro triumphantly announced that it had fired 
Venable for his insensitive online remarks, ending his otherwise 
commendable nine-year career serving Metro citizens.20 In a letter to 
Venable at the conclusion of the investigation, charging him with 
“Conduct Unbecoming an Employee of the Department” and setting a 
disciplinary hearing, Chief Anderson admonished that 
[t]he effectiveness of a law enforcement agency and its members
depends upon community respect and confidence. . . . Whether
interacting with citizens, testifying in any court or legal proceeding,
or providing information in any official setting, the success of a law
enforcement agency rests upon the reliability of the member
representing that agency.
Therefore, all members sworn and civilian must conduct 
themselves in a manner consistent with policies, procedures, rules, 
regulations, ethical codes, and administrative or executive orders as 
established by the [police] department or [Metro]. . . . Recognizing 
that a fundamental and unequivocal duty of all employees is to 
promote the efficient and effective operation of department and 
government operation through the pursuit of lawful objectives, any 
conduct which detracts from this respect and confidence is 
detrimental to the public interest.21  
With that, Metro terminated Venable. 
But was Metro justified, under these circumstances, in firing 
Venable for exercising his First Amendment right to speak? If not, what 
causes of action or remedies might he have? While the retaliation 
claim—a cause of action that accrues when a plaintiff suffers an 
adverse employment action in retaliation for exercising a constitutional 
right—is available to a number of putative plaintiffs in a number of 
Done Five”: Nashville Police Officer Is Under Investigation for Facebook Post Mocking 
Philando Castile’s Death in Minnesota After Beloved Cafeteria Worker’s Girlfriend Said 
He Was Shot Four Times, DAILYMAIL (July 8, 2016, 10:05 AM), https://dailym.ai/ 
2F2MPsy (updated July 8, 2016, 7:55 PM); Kate Feldman, Second Metro Nashville Police 
Officer Decommissioned Within Week for Inappropriate Facebook Post, Changes Profile 
Picture to Black Panthers Photo, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 11, 2016, 7:04 PM), 
https://nydn.us/2EYPsMc; Kate Irby, Officer Suspended for Facebook Comment About 
Philando Castile, MIAMI HERALD (July 8, 2016, 9:31 AM), https://hrld.us/2EWzFgJ. 
20 Press Release, Officer Anthony Venable Fired for Facebook Posting, METRO. GOV’T 
OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENN. (Feb. 15, 2017), http://bit.ly/2EZX1lw 
[hereinafter Venable Fired]. But see Liz Lohuis, Decommissioned Metro Police Officer Had 
Trouble in the Past, WSMV.COM (July 14, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://bit.ly/2EVe34p (reporting 
that Venable used an FBI database to “look up information” about a woman he once arrested, 
and that he admitted to having an extramarital affair with her). 
21 Letter from Steve Anderson, Chief of Metro Police, to Anthony Venable, former 
Metro Police Officer 1 (Feb. 2, 2017), http://bit.ly/2F9fJbO [hereinafter Anderson Letter] 
(emphasis added). 
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contexts, “free speech retaliation claims are asserted predominantly by 
public employees.”22 Title 42 of the United States Code provides a 
vehicle for asserting an employment retaliation claim against a 
municipality: § 1983. The following Part explains the statute’s origin 
and purpose, who can sue or be sued, what a plaintiff must establish in 
a prima facie case, and the tests that apply to employment retaliations 
against public employees. 
II 
SPEECH RETALIATION CLAIMS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1983 
Writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in a well-
studied procedural due process case from the late nineteenth century, 
the learned jurist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously quipped that 
a police officer 
may have a constitutional right to talk . . . but he has no constitutional 
right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which 
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free 
speech . . . by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot 
[later] complain [about alleged rights violations], as he takes the 
employment on the terms which are offered him.23 
This relatively straightforward proposition became the support beam 
on which the United States Supreme Court would rest its public-
retaliation jurisprudence for several ensuing decades.24 But after a 
series of decisions arising out of litigation during the Red Scare, the 
Court turned a corner, and it started providing relief to terminated 
public employees, specifically where the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights led to an adverse employment action of some 
kind.25 As a result, today “a state cannot condition public employment 
on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected 
interest in freedom of expression.”26 Thus, any municipal policy that 
restricts public employees’ speech today must satisfy a balancing test 
to survive a constitutional challenge. 
One of the primary vehicles available to terminated municipal (or 
state) employees to mount these constitutional challenges is § 1983. 
22 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 3.11 
[C][1] at 3-435 (4th ed. 2018). 
23 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892). 
24 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983) (citing McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517). 
25 Id. at 144. 
26 Id. at 142. 
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The following Section explains the history, policy rationales, and 
functioning of the statutory claim in vindicating a plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights as against a state or municipality. The subsequent 
Sections in this Part describe the tests that courts use to measure 
whether termination of a public employee rises to the level of an 
unconstitutional retaliation in a given case. 
A. The Section 1983 Civil Rights Claim
Reacting to Klansmen in state government fiefdoms who were loath 
to give newly emancipated slaves a fair shake in life after the American 
Civil War and pursuant to the authority the states granted to Congress 
when they ratified the Reconstruction Amendments,27 the Radical 
Republicans of the Thirty-Ninth Congress enacted legislation to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees against states’ 
deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.28 
The statute achieved this purpose by creating a federal cause of action 
for cases in which state actors violated someone’s constitutional or 
federal statutory rights. This cause of action is not coextensive with, 
but supplemental to, state-law causes of action that may also be 
available to a plaintiff in a particular case.29 To defeat the effects of 
local prejudices, Congress also conferred original jurisdiction on 
federal district courts to hear § 1983 claims.30 
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).  
28 Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 § 1 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2012)). See also Landmark Legislation: The Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871,
U.S. SENATE, http://bit.ly/2F9nsH1 (last visited Jan 28, 2019); The Fight for the 14th,
BOUND BY OATH (Dec. 19, 2018) (downloaded at http://bit.ly/2FbJhpr).
29 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). For example, in Tennessee, a terminated 
public employee can pursue both a § 1983 claim and a claim under the Tennessee Public 
Employee Political Freedom Act of 1980 for the same alleged speech retaliation. See, e.g., 
Boone v. Town of Collierville, No. 16-cv-2185-JPM-dkv, 2017 WL 980351, at *8–9 (W.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 13, 2017) (granting a municipal defendant’s motion for summary judgment as 
to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his claim 
pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-50-601–604 (2018)). 
30 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)–(4) (2012); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180 (“It is abundantly clear 
that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts 
because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might 
not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and 
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state 
agencies.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (permitting removal of certain civil actions from 
state court to federal court); Marketing Showcase, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 445 F. Supp. 
755, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he purpose of . . . removal is to secure a presumably 
unprejudiced forum for one who has been brought unwillingly to the state court.”). The 
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Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that 
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws [of the United States], shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .31
In its decisions, the Court has divided (but not limited) § 1983 claims 
into three broad categories: (1) procedural due process claims arising 
from deprivations of life, liberty, or property; (2) substantive due 
process claims arising from violations of fundamental rights; and (3) 
claims arising from violations of provisions of the Bill of Rights that 
the Court has incorporated as against the states.32 To establish a prima 
facie § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate, first, that a defendant 
took action under color of state law,33 and second, that the action 
resulted in a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 
statutes.34 “[W]hen execution of a [municipal] government’s policy or 
custom” results in a civil rights violation, a plaintiff may bring a claim 
decision to fire a municipal employee on the basis of speech invariably takes into account 
hyperlocal interests and attitudes and is thus shaped by local prejudices. In a civil case that 
alleges a constitutional harm, justice may require a more neutral forum, and § 1983 
guarantees it. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
32 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We should 
begin by identifying the precise constitutional claims that petitioners have advanced. It is 
not enough to note that they rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
for that Clause is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection.”). Justice 
Stevens observed that § 1983 claims are always available to plaintiffs alleging substantive 
due process theories and claims arising from violations of incorporated rights because “the 
constitutional violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken,” whereas state 
actors may be able to avoid § 1983 liability “if a procedural due process claim lacks a 
colorable objection to the validity of the State’s procedures, [and thus] no constitutional 
violation has been alleged.” Id. at 337–40. Four years later, the Court embraced Justice 
Stevens’s concurrence in Daniels when it decided Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 
(1990). 
33 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (“Misuse of power, possessed 
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 
authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”). 
34 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that 
a [federal] statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by 
§ 1983.”); Macko v. Byron, 576 F. Supp. 875, 880 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (“[I]t is the Court’s
view that § 1983 requires an actual infringement of a constitutional right . . . .”), aff’d 760
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1985).
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against a municipality pursuant to § 1983.35 The legislative history of 
the 1871 Act reveals that the law’s drafters contemplated reaching 
municipal corporations when they used the word “State” in the 
statutory text.36 There are several theories in § 1983 case law under 
which a terminated public employee could seek to impose liability on 
a municipality. The most appropriate theory in a case like the Venable 
Case would be the “official policy” theory of municipal liability 
because the city’s enforcement of a “regulation . . . officially adopted 
and promulgated” by decision makers in the jurisdiction, like a 
departmental social media policy, causes the constitutional violation.37 
Metro’s enforcement of the policy by firing Venable satisfies the first 
step of the prima facie case—action under color of state law—while 
the policy itself satisfies the second step because, as this Article 
contends, the manner in which Metro enforced it arguably caused a 
constitutional violation. 
Courts apply a number of tests to determine whether a defendant has 
violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights—the second step in the 
§ 1983 prima facie case. The next three sections explore relevant case
law governing public employees’ retaliation claims arising from the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
B. Pickering Distinguishes Categories of Speakers
and Speech 
When a public employee invokes § 1983 to challenge an alleged 
retaliation for speech he uttered as a private citizen, courts have, for 
decades, relied on a quartet of Supreme Court decisions to analyze the 
claims. In the first of these cases, Pickering v. Board of Education,38 a 
municipal government issued bonds to raise money to build new 
schools, but then it failed to pass tax increases to fill funding gaps 
despite public support from the local teachers’ union and 
superintendent.39 Marvin Pickering, a district high school teacher, sent 
a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the way his employer 
allegedly mismanaged the bond issue and decried how the 
superintendent allegedly tried to silence opposition to the funding 
35 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
36 Id. at 663–701 (1978) (analyzing the legislative history of the 1871 act and subsequent 
case law to conclude that the Court held incorrectly in Monroe that cities were immune from 
the reach of § 1983, and overruling Monroe on that issue).  
37 Id. at 690. 
38 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
39 Id. at 565–66. 
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schemes.40 Displeased with his caustic letter, and believing that he 
owed the Board of Education various duties of fealty by mere virtue of 
his employment, school administrators fired Mr. Pickering.41 
After failing to obtain relief in Illinois courts, Mr. Pickering 
petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States, alleging that the 
school board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.42 
The Court first concluded that its then recent precedents had 
strengthened First Amendment protections where public employees 
had spoken on matters of public concern, particularly when criticizing 
“nominal superiors.”43 It further found nothing in the record to indicate 
that Mr. Pickering’s letter had caused any disruptions to either his 
personal duties or in the school system more broadly.44 Accordingly, 
the Court reasoned that the Board of Education had no more interest in 
regulating Mr. Pickering’s speech than it did in regulating the speech 
of a hypothetical private citizen sending the same critical letter to the 
editor.45 Therefore, the Court held that the Board of Education could 
not constitutionally fire Mr. Pickering without proof of actual malice, 
and it remanded the case back to the Illinois courts for further 
proceedings.46 
In Pickering, the Court implemented a two-pronged balancing test. 
First, the Court asked whether the employee was speaking as a private 
citizen on a matter of public concern.47 Because Mr. Pickering satisfied 
these factors, the Court next weighed the government’s interest in 
silencing him against his liberty interest in communicating by 
examining whether his letter to the editor caused a workplace 
disruption sufficient to undermine the efficient provision of public 
40 Id. at 566. Mr. Pickering’s letter was rather punchy, even by today’s standards, 
alleging the “totalitarianism” of “push[ing] tax-supported athletics down our throats” and 
“neglecting the wants of teachers.” See David L. Hudson, Jr., Teacher Looks Back on Letter 
That Led to Firing—And Supreme Court Victory, FREEDOM FORUM INST. (July 20, 2001), 
http://bit.ly/2FbJLMh (interviewing Marvin Pickering). “After he drafted his letter, he 
showed it to his wife. ‘She read it and then told me: “You’re probably going to get fired.” 
But I went ahead and sent the letter anyway,’ he says.” Id. 
41 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, 568–69. 
42 Id. at 565. Pickering is not a § 1983 case but its free-speech analysis is relevant in 
determining whether a plaintiff meets the second prong of the prima facie case for § 1983 
claims. See infra note 110 (collecting cases). 
43 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
44 Id. at 569–70. 
45 Id. at 574. 
46 Id. at 574–75. 
47 Id. at 571–72. 
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education services.48 The Court determined that the record was 
conspicuously devoid of any such evidence.49 The Myers case,50 
described in the next Section, reaffirmed the Pickering balancing test 
and provided additional contours to what constitutes a “matter of public 
concern” for First Amendment purposes. 
C. Myers Narrows What Constitutes a “Matter of Public Concern”
The second bellwether of contemporary public employment
retaliation jurisprudence arrived fifteen years after Pickering when the 
Court decided Connick v. Myers. In Myers, the Court refined its 
Pickering analysis by defining what constitutes a “matter of public 
concern.”51 In Myers, New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick 
attempted to transfer Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers to 
another section of the criminal court.52 Because she was competent in 
her job,53 however, and out of fear that the transfer would raise a 
conflict of interest with respect to her volunteer activities in a 
counseling program for criminal defendants on probation in the 
transferee court,54 Ms. Myers resisted the proposal and did “some 
research on the matter.”55 She then prepared a questionnaire for her 
colleagues to answer “concerning office transfer policy, office morale, 
the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in 
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political 
campaigns.”56 
Ms. Myers met with Mr. Connick the next morning, and despite his 
continued urging that she accept the transfer, she said merely that she 
would think about it.57 When Mr. Connick left the office, Ms. Myers 
began circulating her survey on office policy and culture to her 
colleagues.58 A Connick loyalist in the department telephoned Mr. 
Connick to tell him about the survey, warning that Ms. Myers “was 
48 Id. at 573. 
49 Id. at 574. 
50 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Unlike Pickering, Myers was a § 1983 case. 
51 Id. at 147–48. 
52 Id. at 140. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 140 n.1. 
55 Id. at 140–41. 
56 Id. at 141. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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creating a ‘mini-insurrection’ within the office.”59 When Mr. Connick 
returned, he fired Ms. Myers, purportedly “because of her refusal to 
accept the transfer,” but also because, as he told her, “her distribution 
of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination.”60 Mr. 
Connick also admitted that he worried what the press’s reaction would 
be if it learned that his subordinates were discussing whether they had 
confidence in their superiors, or whether any of them felt undue 
pressure to campaign on their superiors’ behalves.61 
On this canvas, Ms. Myers painted her § 1983 prima facie case: Mr. 
Connick was clothed with the authority of state law to fire her by virtue 
of his supervisory position, and he fired her for distributing surveys—
a form of speech—at the office. She prevailed at the district court, 
which determined that her refusal to accept a transfer was but a pretext 
for firing her and that Mr. Connick had really fired her for speaking 
about matters of public concern, as the Board of Education had done to 
Mr. Pickering in 1968.62 The district court also found, like the trial 
court in Pickering, that the state failed to produce clear evidence of 
substantial interference to the workplace, and it awarded Ms. Myers 
back pay, damages, and attorney’s fees.63 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “to seek ‘a balance 
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.’”64 
The Court began its analysis by surveying pre-Pickering case law 
that stands for the proposition that public employees could not be 
“‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge from joining political parties and 
other associations that certain public officials might find 
‘subversive.’”65 It found that “[t]he First Amendment ‘was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people,’” and that this 
principle animated its decision in Pickering.66 That is, the subject of 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 141–42. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 142 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
65 Id. at 143–45 (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 144–45 (citations omitted). 
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Mr. Pickering’s letter to the newspaper, namely the Board of 
Education’s “allocation of school funds between athletics and 
education and its method of informing taxpayers about the need for 
additional revenue,” was “‘a matter of legitimate public concern’ upon 
which ‘free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by 
the electorate.’”67 The Court highlighted that cases applying Pickering 
dealt with “safeguarding speech on matters of public concern.”68 
The Myers Court then modified Pickering by clarifying what does 
and does not fall within the ambit of “matters of public concern.” When 
a public employee’s speech “cannot be fairly considered as relating to 
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” then 
it is not a matter of public concern, and “government officials should 
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,” including firing 
insubordinate employees, “without intrusive oversight by the judiciary 
in the name of the First Amendment.”69 The Court also announced 
factors to help determine whether a public employee is truly speaking 
about a matter of public concern: “Whether an employee’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined [as a matter 
of law] by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record.”70 
Applying these factors to Ms. Myers’s questionnaire, the Court ruled 
that, with the exception of the question asking whether her colleagues 
felt pressure to campaign for their bosses, Myers was not speaking 
about matters of public concern. The Court reasoned that questions 
about internal office matters were not questions 
of public import in evaluating the performance of the District 
Attorney as an elected official. [Ms.] Myers did not seek to inform 
the public that [Mr. Connick] was not discharging [his] governmental 
responsibilities . . . [n]or did [Ms.] Myers seek to bring to light actual 
or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of [Mr.] 
Connick and others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the 
public, would convey no information at all other than the fact that a 
single employee is upset with the status quo.71 
67 Id. at 145 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72). 
68 Id. (emphasis added) (discussing cases applying the Pickering test, including Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), which held that a community college professor stated a 
valid due process violation claim when he alleged that the Board of Regents declined to 
rehire him because he testified at a legislative hearing about whether the Board should 
transform his school into a four-year college, an issue of “public disagreement”). 
69 Id. at 146. 
70 Id. at 147–48. 
71 Id. at 148. 
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Having reached this conclusion, the Court declined to shield Ms. Myers 
from her termination because “[t]o presume that all matters which 
transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean 
that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a 
public official—would plant the seed of” a § 1983 claim.72 While the 
Court briefly discussed the item on the questionnaire that did address a 
matter of truly public concern (the question about employees feeling 
pressure to campaign for their superiors), it held that the Pickering 
balance commanded a conclusion that Mr. Connick justifiably 
dismissed Ms. Myers.73 The Court reasoned that, because Ms. Myers 
prepared and distributed her questionnaire at the office—the creation, 
distribution, and completion of which distracted from her and her 
colleagues’ duties—Mr. Connick had a constitutionally defensible 
interest in terminating her.74 Unlike Pickering, in other words, there 
was evidence in the Myers record that Ms. Myers’s conduct justified 
“[Mr.] Connick’s fears that the functioning of his office was 
endangered.”75 In dicta, the Court hammered home its point, observing 
that 
it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free 
expression if the [First] Amendment’s safeguarding of a public 
employee’s right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions 
concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to 
constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented 
here.76 
Myers reinforced the point that, to receive the protection of the First 
Amendment, and thus for a public employment retaliation to be 
actionable pursuant to § 1983, a public employee must first speak as a 
72 Id. at 149. 
73 Id. at 150–52. 
74 See id. at 152–53 (“Private expression . . . may in some situations bring additional 
factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his 
immediate superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not 
only by the content of the employee’s message, but also by the manner, time, and place in 
which it is delivered.” (quoting Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 
410 415 n.4 (1979))). It is difficult to overstate how low a bar this is for government 
employers to overcome, relative to the strict scrutiny bar governments must meet when 
acting as sovereigns: Sheila Myers’s termination was constitutionally justified simply 
because she distributed a survey at work. Id.; cf. infra notes 228–229 and accompanying text 
(describing tests applicable to content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions for purely 
private speakers). 
75 Connick, 461 U.S. at 153. 
76 Id. at 154. 
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private citizen about a matter of truly public concern;77 the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in other words, is not a “font” of labor law.78 
The distinction between Pickering and Myers concerning whether 
there was evidence in the record that speech actually disrupted the 
workplace raises an interesting jurisprudential concern. Specifically, 
the manner in which the Courts of Appeals have interpreted the 
Pickering-Myers test suggests that government employers have an 
extremely low burden when it comes to invoking a disruption in the 
workplace or to public services as a defense to a retaliation claim. Some 
circuits require proof of an actual disruption.79 The greater weight of 
authorities, however, suggests that federal courts generally require no 
evidence of an actual disruption before giving effect to this defense—
rather, courts require only some argument going above mere 
speculation that an employee’s speech would cause a disruption.80 The 
courts that take this question-of-law approach reason that prudential 
concerns outweigh the employee’s freedom to speak: it is simply better 
public policy, in some courts’ views, to allow a municipal employer to 
remove a potential distraction by firing an employee in certain contexts 
than to allow tensions to come to boil.81 
77 Id. 
78 Cf. Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (“But such a reading would make of the 
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may 
already be administered by the States.”). 
79 See, e.g., Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 496–97 (10th Cir. 1990) (“While these 
arguments have superficial appeal, Gallemore submitted no actual evidence of any 
disruptive confrontations. . . . Because Gallemore has not alleged any disruption as a result 
of Schalk’s actions, and we fail to see any, we hold the Pickering balance tips in favor of 
Schalk.” (emphasis added)). 
80 See, e.g., Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 685–88 (6th Cir. 2017) (discussing a circuit 
split between the Tenth and Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits on 
whether the disruption defense to a retaliation claim requires proof of an actual disruption) 
(citations omitted). In Gillis, the Sixth Circuit held that 
a public employer need not show actual disruption of the public agency in all cases. 
Instead, when the employer does not offer such evidence, we must assess whether 
the employer could reasonably predict that the employee speech would cause a 
disruption, in light of “the time, manner, and place” the speech was uttered, as well 
as “the context in which the speech arose.” 
Id. at 687 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This approach essentially turns what ought 
to be a question of fact into a question of pure law, focusing exclusively on the speaker’s 
initial utterance without considering the conduct of other actors. In so doing, the approach 
also invites life-tenured judges to insert their personal views on offensive utterances into 
their analyses. 
81 See, e.g., id. (“[W]e ‘do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold 
to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is 
manifest before taking action.’” (quoting Anzaldua v. Ne. Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 
793 F.3d 822, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2015))). Courts taking this tack rely on the Supreme Court’s 
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Just over twenty years after Myers, the Court revisited its public 
employment retaliation jurisprudence and issued a decision that 
overturned the proverbial apple cart. As Pickering had done, the new 
ruling categorized certain public employee speakers and their speech. 
In so doing, the Court elucidated an absolute defense to public 
employees’ retaliation claims in some situations, as the next Section 
explains. 
D. Garcetti Severely Limits Speech Protections for
Public Employees 
Since 2006, public employees have had no First Amendment 
protection for speech that they are paid to utter. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos,82 the City of Los Angeles took a number of adverse 
employment actions against Richard Ceballos, a deputy district 
attorney who, in his official capacity as a municipal criminal lawyer, 
dared to argue with his supervisors about the veracity of an affidavit 
that police had used to obtain a search warrant.83 Mr. Ceballos also 
testified for the defense in a suppression hearing in that criminal case.84 
Mr. Ceballos was then “reassign[ed] from his calendar deputy position 
to a trial deputy position, transfer[red] to another courthouse, and 
deni[ed] a promotion,” so he filed a retaliation action in federal district 
court pursuant to § 1983.85 
The Court reasoned, however, that it was precisely because Mr. 
Ceballos had disagreed with his superiors as a calendar deputy that the 
First Amendment did not shield him from the consequences of his 
speech, and thus no constitutional violation had occurred: 
plurality opinion in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673–74 (1994). Gillis, 845 F.3d at 
686. In Waters, the Court acknowledged that “[o]ne could make a respectable argument that
. . . even in a government workplace the free market of ideas is superior to a command
economy. . . . But we have declined to question government employers’ decisions on such
matters.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 673–74. This Article attempts to raise such a respectable
argument in partial hope that the Court will one day reconsider the Waters plurality’s
position and begin questioning government employers’ decisions where the employer has
engaged in conduct that complicates the traditional retaliation analysis. See infra Part IV.
82 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
83 Id. at 413–15. 
84 See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). Mr. Ceballos believed 
that he had an obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to give the defendant 
a copy of his memorandum analyzing the veracity of the affidavit. Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 
1171. He also claimed that, when the defense subpoenaed him to testify in the suppression 
hearing, his supervisor tried to coach his testimony. Id. 
85 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415. 
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The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to [Mr.] 
Ceballos’ official duties. Restricting speech that owes its existence to 
a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe on 
any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It 
simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.86 
In some ways, this reasoning is simply the inverse of the Court’s 
reasoning in Pickering.87 Under that analysis, if the employee spoke as 
a private citizen on a matter of public concern, then the First 
Amendment shields the employee from retaliation because the 
employer has no more interest in controlling speech in that context than 
it would in controlling the speech of a hypothetical private citizen with 
whom it had no employment relationship. But under the Garcetti 
analysis, if the employee spoke as a “public citizen,” even on a matter 
of public concern (including whistleblowing),88 then the government 
employer does have a constitutionally defensible interest in controlling 
the speech.89 Accordingly, the 5–4 Garcetti majority held that no 
constitutional violation had occurred when Mr. Ceballos’s supervisors 
took action against him because the content of his memorandum was 
speech he was paid to utter.90 
In Garcetti, the Court established the principle that the First 
Amendment “[does] not support the existence of a constitutional cause 
of action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course 
86 Id. at 421–22. 
87 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–74 (1968). 
88 See generally David L. Hudson, Jr., No Free Speech for You, SLATE (Aug. 4, 
2017, 2:55 PM), http://bit.ly/2FcbxZ7 (“Anthony Kennedy has the chance to undo his worst 
anti-First Amendment decision. He should take it.”). 
89 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 433 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that various forms of on-
the-job speech, like auditors reporting embezzlement or building inspectors reporting bribes, 
deserve First Amendment protection because they are in the public’s interest). It is worth 
noting the tension between this reasoning and a lawyer’s duty of candor. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly 
. . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows is false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness 
called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal.”). Similarly, lawyers have a professional ethical obligation to 
report certain misconduct of other lawyers; but under Garcetti, government lawyers can be 
fired for doing so with no protection from the First Amendment. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a 
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).  
90 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (“[Public] employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”). 
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of doing his or her job.”91 Therefore, Mr. Ceballos necessarily could 
not make out a prima facie case for a § 1983 claim because he could 
not establish the second step. While his employers were only able to 
reassign him because they were “clothed with the authority of state 
law,”92 and thus they acted “under color of” state law,93 they did not 
violate Mr. Ceballos’s constitutional rights because the Free Speech 
Clause did not protect his arguments with his supervisors over the 
veracity of the affidavit the LAPD used to obtain the search warrant. 
To satisfy the second step of the prima facie § 1983 case against the 
backdrops of Pickering, Myers, and Garcetti, retaliation plaintiffs must 
also establish causation by demonstrating that their constitutionally 
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
employer’s decision to take action against them, as the next Section 
explains. 
E. Doyle’s Causation Analysis
The final piece to the § 1983 retaliation puzzle is the causation 
element, which the Court adopted in Mount Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle.94 Fred Doyle was both a teacher 
in the school district, working consecutive, short-term contracts, and 
the president of the local teachers’ union.95 In the latter role, he 
advocated to increase the number of employment matters that would be 
subject to collective bargaining.96 Unfortunately, his zealous 
personality—which may have made him an effective union 
representative—posed challenges in the workplace, and controversy 
seemingly followed him wherever he went. For example, one day he 
got into a verbal argument with another teacher, who slapped him in 
the face.97 Instead of letting cooler heads prevail or attempting to move 
on from the incident, Mr. Doyle pursued punishment for the other 
teacher until the principal suspended both of them.98 Mr. Doyle also 
91 Id. at 426. 
92 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
93 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
94 429 U.S. 274 (1977), superseded in part by statute, Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) (2012) (establishing a “contributing factor” threshold for 
adjudicating retaliatory terminations of federal whistleblowers).  
95 Doyle, 429 U.S. at 281. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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complained to cafeteria employees about not receiving large enough 
portions, called students “sons of bitches,” and made obscene gestures 
toward female students.99 
The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, however, like 
Marvin Pickering’s letter to the editor of a local newspaper, was Mr. 
Doyle’s telephone call to a local radio station to criticize school 
policies. The principal at Mr. Doyle’s school instituted a faculty dress 
code to try to improve the public’s perception of teachers and hopefully 
increase the district’s chances of securing bond funding.100 Mr. Doyle, 
who, in his dual role as teacher and union representative, thought that 
the decision to implement the dress code should result from a joint 
agreement of faculty and administrators rather than a unilateral 
decision from the principal, called a disc jockey at a local radio station 
to complain, creating a broadcast news item.101 As Mr. Doyle’s short-
term contract drew near its expiration, the superintendent 
recommended to the school board that the district not rehire him, and 
the school board obliged.102 When he asked why the board would not 
renew his teaching contract, Mr. Doyle received a letter “citing ‘a 
notable lack of tact in handling professional matters which leaves much 
doubt to your sincerity in establishing good school relationships’” and 
referencing the radio station incident and his obscene gestures toward 
female students.103 
The district court ruled in a bench trial that Mr. Doyle’s call to the 
radio station “was ‘clearly protected by the First Amendment,’ and that 
because it had played a ‘substantial part’ in the decision of the Board 
not to renew Doyle’s employment, he was entitled to reinstatement 
with backpay.”104 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.105 However, the Court 
was skeptical because there were several reasons in Mr. Doyle’s 
employment record—incidents independent of the radio station call 
and obscene gestures—for the school board to decline to renew his 
contract.106 The Court held that it was proper to impose a burden on 
Mr. Doyle to demonstrate both that the Constitution protected his 
conduct and that his speech was “a ‘substantial factor’—or, to put it in 
99 Id. at 281–82. 
100 Id. at 282. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 282–83. 
104 Id. at 283. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 284–85. 
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other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision 
not to rehire him.”107 Yet the Court also found that the trial record was 
unclear as to whether the school board “would have reached the same 
decision as to [Mr. Doyle’s] re-employment even in the absence of” the 
radio station call, and it vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded the case.108 Thus, Doyle imposes a burden on retaliation 
plaintiffs to establish that the basis of an employer’s decision to 
terminate them was the speech itself. If, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, an employer establishes that it would have fired the employee 
for some other reason, then speech concerns are not implicated by the 
decision to terminate, and the plaintiff cannot establish a First 
Amendment violation as a matter of law, negating the second step of 
the prima facie § 1983 case. 
Later Sections of this Article do not address Doyle’s element of 
causation in Metro’s decision to terminate Venable. Rather, this Article 
assumes, arguendo, that Venable’s speech was the only reason Metro 
fired him, because Chief Anderson’s letter to Venable, in essence, says 
so.109 Moreover, Venable’s meritorious service record and prior 
commendations stand in stark contrast to Mr. Doyle’s employment 
record, which suggested that the former union president was a 
malcontent who was perhaps ill-suited for a social profession. There is 
much less question, therefore, as to whether Doyle’s causation element 
is present in the Venable Case. 
The Courts of Appeals have uniformly addressed the Pickering-
Myers balancing test,110 the Garcetti test,111 and the Doyle causation 
107 Id. at 287 (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977)). 
108 Id. 
109 See Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 4 (“[M]aking such comments has disqualified 
you from serving in a police officer capacity.”). 
110 See generally, e.g., Nichols v. Dancer, 657 F.3d 929, 932–34 (9th Cir. 2011); Evans-
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 337–40 (6th 
Cir. 2010); Miller v. Clinton Cty., 544 F.3d 542, 547–51 (3d Cir. 2008); Richardson v. Sugg, 
448 F.3d 1046, 1061–63 (8th Cir. 2006); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 172–83 (2d Cir. 
2006); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 775–79 (4th Cir. 2004); Gustafson v. Jones, 290 
F.3d 895, 906–12 (7th Cir. 2002); O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1132–39 (D.C. Cir.
1998); Brady v. Fort Bend Cty., 145 F.3d 691, 704–10 (5th Cir. 1998); O’Connor v. Steeves,
994 F.2d 905, 912–17 (1st Cir. 1993); Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 795–98 (10th Cir.
1988); Mings v. Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387–89 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Eiland v.
Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 955–60 (11th Cir. 1986).
111 See generally, e.g., Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 618–21 (11th Cir. 
2015); Gibson v. Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 667–70 (5th Cir. 2014); Bowie v. Maddox, 653 
F.3d 45, 46–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d
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analysis112 at length. Yet a gap exists in this legal framework. 
Specifically, the law fails to address what happens when a municipality 
fires a public employee speaking on his own time purportedly because 
the employee’s speech caused a disruption in the workplace—tipping 
the Pickering-Myers balance in the government’s favor—but the 
workplace disruption arose because the employer issued a press release 
that republished the offending speech and organized a disruption 
against the speaker.113 
Returning to whether Venable would prevail on a retaliation theory 
pursuant to § 1983, we will take both the Garcetti and Pickering-Myers 
paths to answer the question. If the law and facts take us down the first 
path,114 then there would be little reason to write this Article because 
550, 562–64 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (10th 
Cir. 2008); Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126–29 (9th Cir. 
2008); Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 16, 225–28 (3d Cir. 2008); Ruotolo v. City of 
New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188–90 (2d Cir. 2008); Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965–67 
(7th Cir. 2007); Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); Curran 
v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 44–49 (1st Cir. 2007); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, 471 F.3d 918,
920–21 (8th Cir 2006).
112 See generally, e.g., Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 898–900 (7th Cir. 2014); 
Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2011); Davison v. City of 
Minneapolis, 490 F.3d 648, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2007); Ostad v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 327 
F.3d 876, 882–85 (9th Cir. 2003); Wytrwal v. Saco Sch. Bd., 70 F.3d 165, 169–71 (1st Cir.
1995); Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1385–88 (4th Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Dunn Constr.
Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1178–80 (11th Cir. 1992); O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1133
D.C. Cir. 1998); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494–95 (10th Cir. 1990); Fowler v. Bd.
of Educ. of Lincoln Cty., 819 F.2d 657, 660–61 (6th Cir. 1987); id. at 667–68 (Peck, J.,
concurring); Lewis v. Univ. of Pitt., 725 F.2d 910, 915–16 (3d Cir. 1983); Bowen v.
Watkins, 669 F.2d 979, 982–84 (5th Cir. 1982).
113 As discussed in more detail below, that is the novel issue presented here. Although 
Venable was not fired until February 2017, see Venable Fired, supra note 20, Metro issued 
a press release in July 2016 announcing that there was an investigation, see Venable 
Decommissioned, supra note 14. It is likely that the July 2016 press release was the cause 
of the disruption, not Venable’s statement itself. This case is therefore different from 
Jefferies v. Harlston, where state university officials issued a press release that republished 
offensive speech to announce an investigation into the speaker’s conduct—but the 
employee’s speech was already highly publicized. 52 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995) (public 
university professor made televised anti-Semitic remarks at a conference). Venable’s case 
is also distinguishable from Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, where a school board issued 
a press release announcing that it was suspending a high school football coach—but the 
district characterized the coach’s conduct as “an ‘internal personnel issue’” and did not 
repeat his locker-room speech. 149 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1998). Jefferies and 
Lancaster appear to be the only two reported retaliation cases involving a press release, 
underscoring the notion that the Venable Case presents novel facts. 
114 If Venable was paid to speak on Facebook about lethal force, then Metro could 
constitutionally fire him for anything he said on that point. See supra Part II Section D. 
(discussing Garcetti, which established that the First Amendment does not protect every 
statement by a public employee made during the course of his or her work). 
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public employees receive no First Amendment protection for speech 
that a municipality pays them to utter. The second path,115 however, 
reveals that the Pickering-Myers framework is inadequate to cover the 
novel facts of the Venable Case and prospective situations like it. Thus, 
Part III revisits the Venable Case to apply these tenets of free speech 
law, revealing a deficiency in the framework. 
III 
THE VENABLE CASE AND THE GAP IN SECTION 1983’S 
RETALIATION JURISPRUDENCE 
Deciding which doctrine applies to the Venable Case should be a 
relatively easy task. If Venable spoke because he was paid to comment 
on Facebook about the use of lethal force, then Garcetti controls, and 
the constitutional inquiry ends. Metro could permissibly fire Venable 
for his insensitive comment, and he would receive no cover from the 
Free Speech Clause. If Venable spoke as a private citizen on a matter 
of public concern, and there was evidence in the record that his 
insensitive comment disrupted Metro’s ability to function efficiently 
and effectively, or there was a plausible argument that his speech alone 
would cause a disruption, then the Pickering-Myers test controls, and 
Metro should have fired him. However, if Venable spoke as a private 
citizen about a matter of public concern, and there was no evidence in 
the record that his speech caused a disruption to Metro’s ability to 
function, or the argument that it alone would cause a disruption 
amounted to mere speculation, then the Pickering-Myers test still 
applies. But, in this third scenario, the city’s sanction of firing for the 
view Venable expressed on Facebook violated Venable’s free-speech 
rights, and he could state a prima facie § 1983 case. What makes 
Venable’s case novel and exposes the gap in the prevailing framework, 
is the availability of some evidence in the administrative record that his 
speech disrupted the workplace.116 But the evidence here is at best 
suspect and at worst wholly insufficient, largely because of Metro’s 
115 If Venable posted on Facebook as a private citizen, and a police officer’s use of lethal 
force is a matter of public concern, then Metro could constitutionally fire him only if his 
speech disrupted Metro’s efficient delivery of safety services. See supra Part II Sections B 
& C. (discussing Pickering and Myers). 
116 As discussed previously, a municipality’s burden here in many circuits is 
presumptively very low. It need only argue, above a speculative level, that the speech would 
disrupt agency operations. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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conduct between the time Venable uttered his speech and the ensuing 
public outcry. 
Chief Anderson’s letter repeatedly attempts to shoehorn Venable’s 
remarks into the Garcetti framework. Specifically, Chief Anderson 
wrote that “[a]lthough [Venable] did not state [on his Facebook page] 
that [he was] a police officer, [his] comments would lead a reasonable 
person to believe [he was] a police officer”; “[Venable] published 
numerous additional comments that made it sufficiently clear that [he 
was] a law enforcement officer living in Nashville”; that “[s]ome of the 
persons engaged in the internet discussion knew [Venable’s] identity 
and [his] place of employment”; and “[i]t only took someone several 
states away a few keystrokes, on the same World Wide Web on which 
[Venable was] publishing [his] inflammatory remarks, to confirm [his] 
identity and [his] employment.”117 Garcetti, however, does not apply 
to Venable’s situation because Venable was paid to investigate and 
arrest criminal suspects, not to comment on Facebook about the use of 
lethal force. 
The Garcetti test analyzes whether the offending speech “owes its 
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities”118 or 
whether the speech was part and parcel of “tasks [a terminated public 
employee] was paid to perform.”119 Irrelevant to the analysis are the 
listener’s mere awareness that a municipality employs the speaker, 
what a reasonable person would think when hearing or reading the 
offending speech, and the extent the speaker holds himself out as a 
public-sector employee. Venable’s Facebook comment, in other words, 
was no more speech resulting from a “task[] he was paid to perform”120 
simply because a reader could identify him as a police officer than 
written speech on his IRS Form 1040 that lists his occupation as a 
“police officer.” Both mediums identify him as a first responder, but 
neither “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities.”121 
Additionally, it is constitutionally irrelevant that Venable spoke 
about something he ostensibly does in his profession—using deadly 
force. The Court answered this question in Lane v. Franks.122 A 
community college in Alabama hired the plaintiff, Edward Lane, on a 
117 Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 2–3, 5. 
118 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
119 Id. at 422. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 421. 
122 573 U.S. 228 (2014) (9–0 decision). 
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probationary basis to run a program for underprivileged youth.123 The 
program was financially distressed, so Mr. Lane undertook an internal 
audit and discovered that one of its counselors, Suzanne Schmitz, was 
receiving pay without working.124 Mr. Lane’s attempts to counsel Ms. 
Schmitz and improve her performance bore no fruit.125 Although Mr. 
Lane had authority to hire and fire in his role as the program director, 
and despite his attempt to resolve the issue with both Ms. Schmitz and 
his own supervisors, his supervisors and the college’s attorney warned 
him not to fire the underperforming employee under threat of “negative 
repercussions for [Mr. Lane].”126 Nevertheless, Mr. Lane fired Ms. 
Schmitz, which prompted an FBI investigation into her, and she was 
indicted for mail fraud and theft of federal funds.127 Mr. Lane testified 
at the grand jury hearing as to his reasons for firing her, again under 
subpoena at her trial, and a third time during her retrial following a 
hung jury causing the first trial to result in a mistrial.128 Three months 
later, Mr. Lane had a new supervisor, Steve Franks, who fired him.129 
Mr. Lane sued Mr. Franks under § 1983, alleging that he was fired 
in retaliation for testifying against Ms. Schmitz.130 The trial court 
awarded summary judgment to Mr. Franks on qualified immunity 
grounds, holding that, under Garcetti, Mr. Lane had no clearly 
established constitutional right to testify against Ms. Schmitz because 
of his supervisory role over her.131 To conclude that Mr. Lane’s 
testimony deserved no First Amendment protection, the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed and relied on Garcetti’s holding that “speech ‘[that] 
owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional responsibilities’ 
and is ‘a product that the “employer himself has commissioned or 
created.”’”132 
The Court reversed, holding that “the First Amendment protects a 
public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by 
subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities.”133 
123 Id. at 231–32. 
124 Id. at 232. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 232–33. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 233–34. 
130 Id. at 234. 
131 Id. at 234–35. 
132 Id. at 235. 
133 Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor noted that 
Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public 
employment . . . the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns 
information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not 
transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech. 
The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is 
itself ordinarily within the scope of the employee’s duties, not 
whether it merely concerns those duties.134 
Therefore, while it may be tempting to justify Venable’s firing by 
arguing that his comment asserted what he might do in duties that he 
was paid to perform, Garcetti is simply inapposite to the Venable Case 
under Lane.135 
The more appropriate test is the Pickering-Myers balancing test. 
This test asks, first, whether Venable spoke as a private citizen on a 
matter of public concern, and, second, whether his speech created or 
would create such a disruption to Metro’s work that it gave rise to a 
constitutionally defensible termination, weighing the city’s interest in 
public safety against Venable’s liberties.136 Since Metro did not pay 
Venable to comment on social media posts, and he was speaking from 
his personal social media account on a private network while off duty, 
a court would likely reason that he spoke as a private citizen when he 
commented on the Philando Castile shooting. Venable’s comments 
were a matter of public concern because his comments addressed the 
use of force when detaining Philando Castile during a time when 
vigorous public debates on the subject raged across the country,137 
even though the context suggests that Venable was trying to irritate and 
134 Id. at 239–40 (emphasis added). 
135 One could distinguish the Venable Case from Lane on its facts. A Facebook comment 
is clearly not uttered in the same context as sworn testimony given under subpoena in a 
federal criminal case. Similarly, speaking counterfactually about what one would have done 
in a certain workplace situation is categorically distinguishable from speaking about what 
one actually did. Given the reasoning Justice Sotomayor espoused in Lane, however, what 
is determinative as to whether Garcetti applies is whether or not the offending speech was 
speech the employee was paid to utter. That is simply not the case with Venable’s Facebook 
comment. 
136 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142–54 (1983) (discussing the Pickering 
balancing test). 
137 Over half of Americans believe that the prevalence of deadly force in police 
encounters signifies a systemic problem. RICH MORIN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
BEHIND THE BADGE: AMID PROTESTS AND CALLS FOR REFORM, HOW POLICE VIEW THEIR 
JOBS, KEY ISSUES AND RECENT FATAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN BLACKS AND POLICE 81 
(2017), https://pewrsr.ch/2O5wJTm (full report available at the end of article). The disparity 
is even greater among African-Americans. Id. 
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inflame others in the discussion.138 Therefore, a court would also likely 
conclude that he spoke on a matter of legitimate public concern.  
Recall the matter-of-public-concern factors the Court set forth in 
Myers: “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”139 The content here 
was an informal, off-duty conversation about the appropriate level of 
force police can use in a traffic stop that Venable claims was a sarcastic 
joke.140 The form was a comment on a private social network.141 The 
context was that he was speaking to a social acquaintance while off 
duty at a time when the propriety of the Castile shooting dominated 
network, cable, and online news coverage, and a majority of Americans 
have serious concerns about the amount of force police use broadly in 
the course of their daily work—especially with racial minorities. The 
Myers Court expressly noted that issues of racial discrimination are 
constitutionally significant in determining whether a public employee 
138 See Jason Lamb, Ex-Nashville Cop Sues Metro After Being Fired, NEWSCHANNEL5 
(Feb. 14, 2018, 9:15 PM), http://bit.ly/2FaPWQz (collecting screen shots of the offending 
post). 
139 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
140 See Lamb, supra note 138 (showing a screen shot of a post from Facebook user Ed 
Austin from 1:33 PM on July 7, 2016, expressing disgust for Venable’s comment). 
141 Facebook provides a number of native privacy controls to allow end users to toggle 
and adjust the visibility of the content they share on the platform. See, e.g., Brian Barrett, 
The Complete Guide to Facebook Privacy, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2018, 1:10 PM), 
http://bit.ly/2TB8iTK (providing instructions under the “Friends Focus” heading for 
limiting accessibility of personal content). It is not clear from either news reports about the 
Venable Case, the Venable Decommissioned Release, or Chief Anderson’s letter whether 
either Venable or the woman to whose post he was responding had toggled their personal 
settings to limit the audience for the post and ensuing comments. See supra notes 14, 19, 21 
and accompanying text. Rather, Facebook is a private entity that provides a platform, 
governed by private law, where users voluntarily connect to and exchange communications 
with each other after an invitation process called a “Friend Request.” See generally Adding 
Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, http://bit.ly/2TEoJ1L (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019). This dynamic makes the cyberspace locus for the exchange more like a 
person’s living room, where participants have been invited into the discussion, than a 
traditional public forum like a park or a sidewalk that “by long tradition or by government 
fiat [has] been devoted to assembly and debate,” where Venable was haphazardly 
broadcasting his views to anyone within earshot. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Venable’s choice to communicate his views on 
Facebook as opposed to setting up a podium in the middle of Broadway in downtown 
Nashville with a bullhorn is constitutionally significant. Cf. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (“Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions 
indicate that this freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to 
communicate privately . . . rather than to spread his views before the public.”). 
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spoke on a matter of public concern.142 The only inquiry that remains 
under Pickering-Myers is whether Metro could mount a credible case 
that Venable’s comment caused or would plausibly cause a workplace 
disruption sufficient to trigger Metro’s interest in firing him. 
Chief Anderson’s letter offers scant evidence of any actual 
workplace disruption.143 Chief Anderson presented the factual record 
as: 
On July 7, 2016 the Office of Professional Accountability and Sgt. 
James Capps received a complaint that you posted an inappropriate 
comment on Facebook. . . .  
. . . Mr. David McMurry, one of the board members of the 
Madison Chamber of Commerce was notified of the posting. . . .  
Google search results yielded that 10 pages . . . of articles relating to 
this incident were not only covered locally, but nationally and 
internationally. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . This incident created a disruption in the workplace which not 
only affected the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, but also 
the Metro Government as a whole.144 
The letter also described the nature of the disruption that Venable 
allegedly caused: 
It was because of . . . your inflammatory comments being the subject 
of several news stories broadcast in Nashville, that the leadership of 
the police department joined numerous members of the clergy, 
accompanied by numerous elected officials, including the mayor, and 
numerous community leaders, gathered on the plaza of the Criminal 
Justice Center to hold a prayer vigil. In fact . . . all of these people 
dropped what they were doing and filled the plaza with little more 
than two hours’ notice. . . .  
142 461 U.S. at 146 (citing Givhan). Overtly racist jokes, however, are not matters of 
public concern—at least not in California or Massachusetts. See Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112 (Mass. 2000); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010). 
143 As of this writing, the author has not filed a Tennessee Public Records Act request 
with Metro to obtain additional evidence to more fully evaluate the Venable Case in the 
context of the prevailing First Amendment tests, although Tennessee law makes that an 
option. See generally TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(c)(1), (3) (2012 & Supp. 2017); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(g) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (exceptions to disclosure of and additional 
requester requirements for law-enforcement personnel records). This is perhaps one avenue 
for future research of the Venable Case and situations like it in states where open records 
laws permit access to personnel records. 
144 Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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Your declarations on the World Wide Web . . . also created an 
uncomfortable atmosphere for every employee on the . . . Police 
Department . . . .145 
Chief Anderson’s letter, however, gives a myopic view of the 
Venable Case. While Chief Anderson’s letter alleges that news stories 
about Venable’s deplorable comments surfaced on July 7, 2016, his 
letter conspicuously fails to mention that Metro issued a press release 
about the Venable Case that day.146 To demonstrate the significance of 
this omission from the record, one cannot find a single negative report 
about Venable prior to July 7, 2016, using native search engine tools 
with customized date ranges.147 Rather, not until July 7, 2016, does 
negative press coverage of Venable’s Facebook comment surface.148 
Nashville’s newspaper of record, The Tennessean, did not publish a 
story about the incident until 10:26 p.m. that day.149 WSMV Channel 
4, the local NBC affiliate, published an online story at 9:53 p.m.,150 
only slightly earlier than The Tennessean. Prior to the news coverage 
of Venable’s comments late in the day on July 7, 2016, there is record 
of only one social media user who complained about Venable’s 
comment at 1:33 p.m.151 Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to infer 
that Metro’s press release played a predominant role in Metro 
employees “dropp[ing] what they were doing . . . with little more than 
two hours’ notice”152 to reassure the public that Venable was just a bad 
apple in an otherwise wholesome bushel. In fact, based on the nature 
of the coverage,153 it strains credulity to think that these news 
organizations received notice of Venable’s comments organically, 
reported on them, and only then did Metro respond with a press release. 
Had that been the case, the news coverage would likely have been 
145 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
146 See id.; Venable Decommissioned, supra note 14. 
147 See Google Search, “anthony venable”, GOOGLE, http://bit.ly/2yJ1ipj (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2017) (using custom date range of January 1, 2001, to July 6, 2016). 
148 See Google Search, “anthony venable”, GOOGLE, http://bit.ly/2AJ3v4K (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2017) (using custom date range of July 7, 2016, to November 15, 2017). But see 
Lamb, supra note 138 (showing a screen shot of a post from Facebook user Ed Austin from 
1:33 PM on July 7, 2016, expressing disgust for Venable’s comment). 
149 Sawyer, supra note 19 (reporting that Metro first learned of Venable’s post around 
3:00 p.m. on July 6, 2016). 
150 Stuart Ervin, Metro Officer Decommissioned over Facebook Post Apparently 
Referencing MN Shooting, WSMV.COM (July 7, 2016, 9:53 PM), http://bit.ly/2TCub59. 
151 See Lamb, supra note 138. 
152 Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 6. 
153 See Sawyer, supra note 19; Ervin, supra note 150. 
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hostile to Chief Anderson, and possibly former Mayor Megan Barry, 
instead of focusing solely on Venable’s comments and Chief 
Anderson’s reaction to them. It is likewise perplexing to think that 
Venable’s speech disrupted police work by itself, simply because 
Metro had to allocate police resources to monitor a public protest—
which is police work in itself154—when police cannot always 
accurately predict when or where they will be needed.155 Rather, Metro 
disrupted its own work by publicizing Venable’s comments. 
It is also not entirely plausible that Venable’s comment, standing 
alone, would have caused a disruption if Metro did not fire him. Only 
a handful of people knew about his comment,156 making it unlikely, 
given “‘the time, manner, and place’ the speech was uttered, as well as 
‘the context in which the speech arose,’”157 that his comment would 
cause a disruption to the delivery of safety services citywide. Rather, 
Metro’s concern seems like it was speculative at best before it decided 
to issue a press release that republished the comment on a large scale. 
Thus, the Venable Case highlights a gap in the law that the Courts 
of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court should fill. There is no 
precedent or rule to follow in a case like Venable’s, where the public 
may never have known about a first responder’s offensive speech but 
for the government employer issuing a press release, republishing the 
speech to convey the basis for an investigation, and effectively 
organizing the public against the politically incorrect speaker. This is 
especially true where a municipal employer’s burden is presumptively 
low, and it need not offer evidence of an actual disruption to the 
154 See, e.g., NASHVILLE, TENN. MUN. CODE tit. 2, div. I, ch. 2.44, art. I, § 2.44.020(A) 
(2006) (“The department of metropolitan police shall be responsible . . . for the preservation 
of the public peace . . . .”).  
155 See Compstat: A Crime Reduction Management Tool, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. ASH 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INNOVATION, http://bit.ly/2F9an04 (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2019) (describing the innovative-but-still-reactive statistical tools that enable police 
departments to more effectively deploy their personnel to manage and reduce the incidence 
of crime in a given jurisdiction). 
156 According to Chief Anderson’s letter, the universe of people on July 7, 2016, who 
knew about Venable’s comments was very small: some Facebook users who could identify 
Venable as a police officer, whoever reported the comments to Sergeant James Capps, and 
whoever reported the comments to David McMurry of the Madison Chamber of Commerce. 
Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 2. Obviously, as the author of the comments, Venable 
himself also knew about the comments—but it is highly unclear that a large enough group 
of people sufficient to “create a disruption” in Metro’s operations knew about the comments 
before Metro issued the press release announcing that Venable had been decommissioned. 
See id. 
157 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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delivery of public services in most circuits.158 Therefore, courts should 
embrace a new rule because speakers have weighty interests in 
exercising their rights as freely as possible, and the public has a 
similarly profound interest in upholding the Free Speech Clause. 
Moreover, strict application of the Pickering-Myers test would result in 
injustice that subsequent Sections of this Article attempt to remedy. 
Applying the Pickering-Myers test narrowly without considering the 
totality of the circumstances of the Venable Case or future similar cases 
would make a mockery of the First Amendment by essentially 
punishing the plaintiff for the conduct of the government whose de 
facto censorship already harmed the plaintiff. 
Part IV attempts to develop a rule that operates within the existing 
Garcetti and Pickering-Myers frameworks. That is, the Venable Rule 
would still permit municipal employers to terminate employees on the 
basis of the content of offensive speech under the prevailing tests if the 
employer demonstrates that an employee’s speech alone actually 
disrupted the workplace. But the Venable Rule would protect public 
employees from retaliation when “the public” may never have heard an 
employee’s offending speech but for the employer’s conduct. 
Candidly, it is difficult to estimate the breadth of this problem, 
largely because it is very difficult to know who has suffered an 
unconstitutional retaliation, where, and when if putative plaintiffs do 
not file lawsuits. Under the prevailing framework, some terminated 
employees have no incentive to incur the costs of litigation.159 It is 
simply impossible to win on these facts under the status quo, so it is 
important to resolve these legal issues. Without modification, any 
municipality with a social media policy is a target-rich environment for 
public employment decision makers who want nothing more than to 
sacrifice a rhetorical opponent on the altar of political correctness, even 
if it risks violating the opponent’s civil rights. Although Metro may not 
solely have sought positive publicity or attempted to promote social 
justice by publicizing Venable’s comments, investigating him, and 
ultimately firing him, the opportunity for any municipal employer to 
abuse its powers, combined with its motives to manicure the public’s 
158 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
159 Although some § 1983 plaintiffs are able to recover their attorney fees after 
prevailing in a suit, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (providing attorney’s fees for 
meritorious § 1983 claims), many plaintiffs may not prevail. Additionally, there are other, 
nonmonetary costs of litigation—such as the time needed to devote to one’s case and the 
stress that comes with suing one’s employer. Those costs cannot be recovered.  
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perceptions of government, presents the need to modify current civil 
rights laws. 
IV 
SKETCHING THE VENABLE RULE 
Notwithstanding sociopolitical tensions rising in a divided, 
pluralistic society, the ease with which Metro fired Venable marks a 
substantial step backward for a free society. The First Amendment 
should not tolerate a municipality using technological tools or press 
releases to organize the public against a disfavored speaker and then 
justifying its censorship on the basis of the chaos it fomented. Thus, 
courts should hold an evidentiary hearing when municipal employers 
invoke the disruption defense to a public employment retaliation claim 
and, first, require proof of an actual disruption to public services and 
second, permit § 1983 plaintiffs to rebut their employers’ evidence of 
workplace disruption with evidence that the employers’ publication or 
republication of the offending speech caused the disruption. This 
approach better comports with due process than the status quo,160 in 
that it gives both sides an opportunity to be heard and present evidence 
as to the source of the dispute.161 Free-speech theory, how technology 
potentially alters or intensifies jurisprudential concerns, and other legal 
and equitable doctrines help explain why the courts should adopt the 
Venable Rule. The law is highly skeptical of both governmental efforts 
to regulate the marketplace of ideas and of providing relief or 
160 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (providing that, in many circuits, the 
disruption analysis is a question of law for courts answered by whether speech merely would 
cause a disruption). 
161 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 
385, 394 (1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 
411, 429 (1969) (“The right to present evidence is, of course, essential to the fair hearing 
required by the Due Process Clause.” (citing Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 
(1938)). In fact, a straightforward application of the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319 (1976), virtually compels this conclusion. Because a terminated employee in 
an appropriate test case has such a strong private interest in speaking freely, see infra Part 
IV Sections A & C, the employer’s interest in fiscal management is negligible since it is 
already incurring litigation costs in defending a retaliation claim, and it would incur 
relatively small marginal costs to navigate an evidentiary hearing in that litigation, and the 
risk of an encroachment on speech rights without a hearing is high without the additional 
procedural safeguard of a full evidentiary hearing on the cause of an actual workplace 
disruption, the Venable Rule strengthens due process—the very aspect of the Constitution 
that § 1983 was designed to enforce. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 355 (discussing Goldberg, 
397 U.S. at 263–71). 
2019] Purged by Press Release: First Responders, Free Speech, 511 
and Public Employment Retaliation in the Digital Age
vindication in the courts to litigants who have affirmatively created a 
legal dispute. 
A. Social Progress Through the Marketplace of Ideas—
Even Bad Ideas 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes162 
The Anglo-American philosophical tradition has argued for 
centuries for the protection of free expression. For decades, the law has 
delivered on that promise in several ways. As early as the mid-
seventeenth century, John Milton was imploring the English 
Parliament to abandon its plan to regulate the content of printed books. 
Milton urged that great achievements had come to pass across the 
epochs in Europe due to the vibrant and dynamic information 
ecosystem that prevailed in Britain: 
Lords and Commons of England! consider what nation it is 
whereof ye are, and whereof ye are the governors: a nation not slow 
and dull, but of a quick, ingenious and piercing spirit, acute to invent, 
subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the 
highest that human capacity can soar to. Therefore the studies of 
learning in her deepest sciences have been so ancient and so eminent 
among us, that writers of good antiquity and ablest judgment have 
been persuaded that even the school of Pythagoras and the Persian 
wisdom took beginning from the old philosophy of this island. And 
that wise and civil Roman, Julius Agricola, who governed once here 
for Caesar, preferred the natural wits of Britain before the laboured 
studies of the French. Nor is it for nothing that the grave and frugal 
Transylvanian sends out yearly from as far as the mountainous 
borders of Russia, and beyond the Hercynian wilderness, not their 
youth, but their staid men, to learn our language and our theologic 
arts. 
. . . . 
What would ye do then? should ye suppress all this flowery crop 
of knowledge and new light sprung up and yet springing daily in this 
162 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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city? Should ye set an oligarchy of twenty engrossers over it, to bring 
a famine upon our minds again, when we shall know nothing but what 
is measured to us by their bushel? Believe it, Lords and Commons, 
they who counsel ye to such a suppressing do as good as bid ye 
suppress yourselves . . . . If it be desired to know the immediate cause 
of all this free writing and free speaking, there cannot be assigned a 
truer than your own mild and free and humane government. It is the 
liberty, Lords and Commons, which your own valorous and happy 
counsels have purchased us, liberty which is the nurse of all great 
wits; this is that which hath rarefied and enlightened our spirits like 
the influence of heaven; this is that which hath enfranchised, enlarged 
and lifted up our apprehensions, degrees above themselves.163 
Thus, we protect speech today, not only because the speaker herself has 
a right to her uninhibited expression, but also because, as classical 
liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote, society at large has a right 
to the benefits that flow from a market-like exchange that occurs when 
speakers utter their ideas.164 When members of the public realize that 
their beliefs are incorrect and that a speaker’s belief is correct, the 
members of the public benefit from the opportunity to correct their 
errors. When a speaker is incorrect, the public benefits from a “clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error”; members of the public can establish the righteousness of 
their position by observing the “wrong” position.165 Accordingly, the 
Court has recognized a “right to receive information and ideas.”166 This 
right is reciprocal to the First Amendment’s protections of speech and 
press in two ways: “First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably 
from the sender’s First Amendment right to send them . . . . More 
importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the 
163 John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the 
Parliament of England, in IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 52, 79–80, 83 (Vincent Blasi 
ed., 2d. ed. 2012) (1644). 
164 JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69, 85 (Geraint Williams ed., 
Everyman Books 1993) (1859). For a meditation on the asymmetry between robust efforts 
to regulate economic activity in the marketplace and the hands-off approach to regulating 
speech, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 49 UCLA L. REV. 959 
(1995). 
165 MILL, supra note 164, at 85; see also First Nat’l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 
(1978) (“[The First Amendment] afford[s] the public access to discussion, debate, and the 
dissemination of information and ideas.”). “Even decisions seemingly based exclusively on 
the individual’s right to express himself acknowledge that the expression may contribute to 
society’s edification.” Id.; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“What 
is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any 
possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of 
free speech as the best of literature.”). 
166 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
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recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and 
political freedom.”167 In this tradition, uninhibited speech yields robust 
education and unrestrained creativity, which are critical to social 
progress and the sine qua non of effective self-government. 
Another commentator, Jonathan Rauch, has continued to carry the 
banner for this permissive tradition with what he calls “The Liberal 
Principle” for divining social truths, the application of which requires 
“[c]hecking of each by each through public criticism” once each gets to 
hear the other’s speech.168 The Liberal Principle springs from the 
ethical proposition that people generally have no right to not be 
offended.169 Using speech to counteract speech is peaceful, and thus 
society should prefer The Liberal Principle to a more brutal 
alternative.170 If the goal of The Liberal Principle’s mechanism is to 
advance social goals through an information exchange that leads to a 
common understanding of what is “right” and “true” in the world, then 
it is necessary for the law to permit speech we dislike to flourish 
alongside speech of which we approve. 
Unfortunately, as seems to have occurred in the Venable Case, much 
of contemporary American society has eschewed The Liberal Principle 
167 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion). People can 
meaningfully and peacefully effect change in government where public debate flourishes 
because speech is free, and people have access to the voting franchise. See VÁCLAV HAVEL, 
On the Theme of an Opposition, in OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965–1990 at 25, 
26–27 (A.G. Brain ed., Paul Wilson trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) (1968). Put another 
way, the free exchange of ideas helps correct information asymmetries in the market for 
political representation, thereby reducing agency loss. See, e.g., CLIFFORD WINSTON, 
GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY 
RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 27–41 (Brookings Inst. Press 2006) 
(describing the market failure of imperfect information and various steps the federal and 
state governments take to correct the informational imbalance between producers and 
consumers); see also SAMUEL KERNELL & GARY C. JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 19 (2d ed. 2003) (defining “agency loss” as “the discrepancy between what 
principals would ideally like their agents to do and how these agents actually behave”). 
168 JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 
6 (1993) (emphasis added). 
169 Id. at 22. This ethic has not manifested fully in Anglo-American law, which imposes 
liability in many jurisdictions for, among other things, the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, sometimes called “outrage.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 46
(2012).
170 See RAUCH, supra note 168, at 20–22 (describing the Islamic response to a Salman 
Rushdie novel, including Ayatollah Khomeini’s missive that “all good Muslims [should] 
kill Salman Rushdie”). By contrast, imagine, if you will, a world in which twelve Charlie 
Hebdo employees had not been murdered in retaliation for satirical cartoons. Cf. Editorial, 
The Charlie Hebdo Massacre in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2FaQFBh. 
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in favor of “thought vigilantism—citizen posses organized to punish 
people with wrong and dangerous ideas.”171 Sometimes, this 
vigilantism manifests through the “heckler’s veto,”172 a softer form of 
regulating the information marketplace in which authorities 
preemptively silence a speaker to avert a credible threat of physical 
violence against the speaker, as opposed to dealing with the threat of 
violence head-on.173 This reflexive impulse to punish people for 
speaking, or silence their views, has begun to take harsher form in the 
law: “Recent years have seen the rapid rise of what have become 
known as hate-crime statutes, which typically create special criminal 
offenses or require special sentences for crimes committed ‘with 
specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that 
person’s race, color, religion, gender, or national origin.’”174 Similarly, 
in the civil context, even in the legal profession, a movement has been 
afoot in recent years to amend the Rules of Professional Conduct across 
the states to curtail speech related to the practice of law that might 
offend someone.175 Recent studies also suggest a growing trend among 
171 See RAUCH, supra note 168, at 23; see also cf. generally RAY BRADBURY, 
FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953) (using dystopian science fiction to warn against the dangers of 
censorship through a tale of a “fireman,” whose job entails burning books to prevent 
unorthodox views from corrupting members of the public). 
172 Patrick Schmidt, Heckler’s Veto, FIRST AM. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://bit.ly/2F8BJ6F 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2019). 
173 Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (concluding 
that wearing black armbands in a public high school to protest the Vietnam War did not 
credibly give rise to disruptions at school that administrators predicted when it suspended 
the petitioners for refusing to remove their armbands). At least in the Ninth Circuit, however, 
and at least in the public high school context, the heckler’s veto appears to be good law. See 
Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 2014) (condoning a public 
high school’s decision to require native-born students to remove American flag shirts to 
avert threats of racial violence on Cinco de Mayo), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1700 (2015). For 
a brief exposition that attempts to thread the needle between competing speech and violence-
prevention interests in the educational context, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Free Expression 
on Campus: Mitigating the Costs of Contentious Speakers, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
163 (2018). Given the rising racial tensions in the United States, and threats of violence 
against police officers, the heckler’s veto may be an animating concern of municipal police 
department social media policies that proscribe certain types of speech. 
174 RAUCH, supra note 168, at 24. The Court, however, “has never recognized a special 
category of ‘hate speech’ that is excluded from First Amendment protection based on its 
message alone.” NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE 
SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP xxi (2018). But see RAUCH, supra note 168, at 24 (noting the 
categorical difference in hate-crimes and hate-speech approaches to speech regulation). 
175 David L. Hudson, Jr., States Split on New ABA Model Rule Limiting Harassing or 
Discriminatory Conduct, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2017), http://bit.ly/2F7qdZa. Despite the support 
of the Tennessee Bar Association and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, 
Rule 8.4(g) ultimately failed in Tennessee. See Stephen Elliott, AG Questions 
Constitutionality of Attorney Rule Change, NASHVILLE POST (Mar. 26, 2018), 
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millennials of tolerating certain kinds of censorship.176 Regardless of 
the approach, and notwithstanding that the impulse to regulate or 
silence offensive speech sometimes even comes from a good, 
“humanitarian” place, it nevertheless invites policing authorities to 
abuse their power by, for example, redefining what constitutes a 
“mistake” or what is “offensive” for self-serving purposes.177 Courts 
should, at least, be suspicious of these social tendencies to the extent 
that they animate public policies restricting speech. 
To wit, bringing The Liberal Principle full circle to Milton’s 
impassioned learning-and-human-progress heuristic, and Mill’s 
marketplace-of-ideas framework, Rauch concludes: 
Will someone’s [wrong] belief, if accepted, destroy society? 
Maybe. But more likely not. . . . So often have those who warned us 
about “dangerous” ideas been wrong, and so often have they abused 
whatever restraining power they possessed, that I have no hesitation 
in saying: it is better in every case to let critical public inquiry run its 
course than to try to protect society from it. . . . 
. . . . 
So let us be frank, once and for all: creating knowledge is painful, 
for the same reason that it can also be exhilarating. Knowledge does 
not come free to any of us; we have to suffer for it. We have to stand 
naked before the court of critical checkers and watch our most 
cherished beliefs come under fire. Sometimes we have to watch while 
our notion of evident truth gets tossed in the gutter. Sometimes we 
feel we are treated rudely, even viciously. As others prod and test and 
criticize our ideas, we feel angry, hurt, embarrassed . . . . 
http://bit.ly/2O0muiY (discussing Rule 8.4(g)’s overbreadth, its potential for arbitrary and 
capricious enforcement, and other constitutional concerns); Daniel Horwitz, Tennessee 
Supreme Court Denies Proposed Rule Change Attempting to Police Discrimination and 
Harassment, SUP. CT. OF TENN. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2018), http://bit.ly/2O0qosi (“Despite its 
laudable goals, the proposed amendments suffered from serious shortcomings.”). It is also 
failing elsewhere as both a content-based restriction and viewpoint-based restriction on 
lawyers’ speech. Kim Colby, Two More State Supreme Courts Reject ABA Model Rule 
8.4(g), FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Sept. 17, 2018), http://bit.ly/2O0lA66. For a defense of Rule 
8.4(g) in light of its tension with free speech principles, see Robert N. Weiner, “Nothing to 
See Here”: Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and the First Amendment, 41 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125 (2018).
176 See Matthew Hennessey, Zero Hour for Generation X, CITY J.,
http://bit.ly/2O3DRzp (last visited May 28, 2018) (reporting that a significant minority of 
millennials approve of federal government censorship, two-thirds approve of university 
speech codes, and almost half would permit banning the media from covering campus 
protests in certain instances). 
177 RAUCH, supra note 168, at 123–24 (explaining how the Spanish Inquisition “was a 
policing action. But by its own lights it was a humanitarian action, too.”). 
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. . . . 
I am certainly not saying that we should all go out and be offensive 
or inflammatory just for the sake of it. Please don’t paint swastikas 
on the synagogue and say I gave my blessing. I am against offending 
people for fun. But I am also only too well aware that in the pursuit 
of knowledge many people—probably most of us at one time or 
another—will be hurt, and that this is a reality which no amount of 
wishing or regulation can ever change. It is not good to offend people, 
but it is necessary. A no-offense society is a no-knowledge 
society.178 
Moreover, practically speaking, laws in Rauch’s humanitarian-
Inquisition mold that attempt to stifle or silence views that hurt people’s 
feelings are not only ineffective but these laws can also breed social 
resentment that spawns an even larger volume of offensive speech, or 
speech that gives worse offense, than the original utterance.179 
Thus, as a general matter, contrary to Justice Frank Murphy’s 
pronouncement in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,180 the relative 
freeness of speech should not turn on what a judge or jury thinks its 
value to society happens to be. To suggest otherwise would be to 
suggest that “a higher authority can revoke rights once they cease to 
serve some vaguely-defined public purpose [of shaping a 
predetermined social outcome].”181 Rather, the law should presume 
that all speech—even and perhaps especially offensive speech—has 
value to society in the Anglo-American tradition and economic value 
in the information marketplace. Absent a strong countervailing 
showing (like strict scrutiny), this presumption yields the conclusion 
that all speech deserves protection. Any rule we might fashion to bridge 
the gap in free speech law that the Venable Case exposed must take 
into account the many benefits that inure to society from the free 
exchange of even troubling ideas, the practical damage that censorship 
can do to both speaker and listener, and the way that unconstitutional 
178 Id. at 124–26; see also STROSSEN, supra note 174, at 4 (“[W]e cherish speech 
precisely because of its unique capacity to influence us, both positively and negatively. But 
even though speech can contribute to potential harms, it would be more harmful to both 
individuals and society to empower the government to suppress speech for that reason, 
except consistent with emergency and viewpoint neutrality principles.”). 
179 See STROSSEN, supra note 174, at 133–56 (discussing, with reference to both history 
and hypotheticals, the many problems with laws that attempt to silence offensive speech). 
180 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well observed that [there are narrowly limited 
classes of speech that] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that might be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest and order in morality.”). 
181 Joe Albanese, Free Speech Is Free Speech, Regardless of Whether It Advances One’s 
Societal Goals, INST. FREE SPEECH (Mar. 28, 2018), http://bit.ly/2O0GcuZ. 
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retaliation violates the rights of both speaker and listener. These 
questions take on new weight in the digital information age, as the next 
Section demonstrates. 
B. A New Free Speech Jurisprudence for the Digital Age?
Technology evolves faster than lawmakers and courts can 
practically match. The evolving communications paradigm may 
necessitate more stringent protections for speech because online 
technology gives individuals access to a large volume of information 
and allows complex interconnections among otherwise isolated actors. 
Specifically, because of the way technology evolves and produces 
relative virtues and vices of online communication, courts should 
modify existing civil rights law sooner, rather than later, to try to deter 
digitally enhanced abuses. The next subsection discusses some of the 
democratizing features of online communication that are worth 
preserving at law. 
1. The Virtues of Online Communication
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could 
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, 
and news groups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. 
As the District Court found, “the content on the Internet is as diverse 
as human thought.” 
—Justice John Paul Stevens182 
The commercial internet, which is still in its infancy despite how 
powerful it has become, has completely and forever changed the 
amount of information that people can access at any given time and the 
speed with which information travels. These changes have arguably 
democratized societies around the world, at least to the extent that 
online tools have decentralized broadcasting power from governments 
and legacy media gatekeepers.183 The commercial internet enables fast, 
182 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
183 See, e.g., MARTIN LISTER ET AL., NEW MEDIA: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 10 
(2003). See also generally JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: 
DEMOCRACY, THE INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING (2004) (arguing that 
the commercial internet had already become, and would continue to develop as, a populist 
tool for campaigning and political organizing, which would yield progressive victories at 
the ballot box). 
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cheap “horizontal knowledge” at scale.184 Governments also now 
provide a number of online services that empower people to engage in 
the democratic process in new ways.185 Some people use the 
commercial internet to connect with their local communities.186 Media 
scholars were correct when they prophesied that the commercial 
internet would become a new kind of public sphere for debate and 
exchange of ideas.187 Some of the biggest drivers of technological 
change in the last few decades have been self-styled social visionaries. 
For example, Dave Morin, a former Apple marketer who was 
recruited by Facebook’s Dustin Moskovitz and Sean Parker to join the 
social networking giant, prepared for Facebook’s 2007 “f8” platform 
launch event by reading Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America and Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations,188 staples of 
Western political and economic thought. He also characterized 
Facebook’s mission as “mak[ing] society more open . . . across more 
contexts” so that people become empowered to “worry less about being 
who they actually are.”189  
Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s creator, was disappointed when 
software developers started running game applications on the platform, 
despite the games’ promise of profit, because Zuckerberg “wanted his 
company to help people communicate things that mattered, not make it 
easier [for people] to play around.”190 He wanted “to help people 
understand the world around them” by connecting them to each other 
in ways that no other website or legacy media provider had yet 
accomplished.191 As he later told a reporter in Spain in 2008, “[i]f you 
184 GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: HOW MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY 
EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT AND OTHER 
GOLIATHS 121 (2006). Professor Reynolds defines horizontal knowledge as 
“communication among individuals, who may or may not know each other, but who are 
loosely coordinated by their involvement with something, or someone, of mutual interest,” 
and this knowledge is what imbues people with power in society. Id. 
185 DENNIS W. JOHNSON, CONGRESS ONLINE: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN CITIZENS 
AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 83 (2004) (describing the Bush administration’s 2003 launch 
of regulations.gov, a website where anyone with internet access can file opinions during an 
informal agency rulemaking comment period, something that “ha[d] always been an 
insider’s game”). 
186 Id. at 84 (citing WENDY LAZARUS ET AL., THE CHILDREN’S P’SHIP, ONLINE 
CONTENT FOR LOW-INCOME AND UNDERSERVED AMERICANS: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE’S 
NEW FRONTIER 9 (2000)). 
187 LISTER ET AL., supra note 183, at 176–80. 
188 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 188, 223 (2010). 
189 Id. at 207. 
190 Id. at 228. 
191 Id. at 143. 
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give people a better way to share information it will change people’s 
lives.”192  
Zuckerberg’s grand vision later paid off on a global scale: Facebook, 
the platform that evolved from a dormitory room at Harvard University, 
helped to scale organizational efforts in Tunisia and Egypt during the 
“Arab Spring” revolution.193 Facebook also affected domestic politics 
within a few short years of its founding: young people organized on 
Facebook to propel Barack Obama, the first African American 
president, to the White House in 2008.194 
Today’s online ecosystem has many desirable features, and it is still 
developing. However, the commercial internet also has several 
downsides that courts should consider as they continue to adjudicate 
new issues presented by technological progress. The next subsection 
discusses some of these downsides.  
2. The Vices of Online Communication
The biggest problem with most predictions about technology is that
they are invariably made based on how the world works today rather 
than on how it will work tomorrow. . . . Politics, economics, and 
culture constantly reshape the environment that technologies were 
supposed to transform . . . . 
—Evgeny Morozov195 
There are also several drawbacks to a robust online ecosystem. For 
example, because people can organize and amplify a message easily on 
the internet, they can manufacture a digital safe haven for abhorrent 
192 Id. at 278. 
193 See John Pollock, How Egyptian and Tunisian Youth Hacked the Arab Spring, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Aug. 23, 2011), http://bit.ly/2O55lVC. But see Sara Reardon, Was the Arab 
Spring Really a Facebook Revolution?, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/2O2gExq (“While Facebook, Twitter and YouTube certainly played a role in 
the way the Arab Spring unfolded, their influence was far less critical than many had 
suggested.”). Zuckerberg launched Facebook from his Harvard University dorm room on 
February 4, 2004. Our History, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://bit.ly/2O1Tdoj (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2019). 
194 See GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE FIRST CAMPAIGN: GLOBALIZATION, THE WEB, AND 
THE RACE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 13, 256 (2007) (recounting how many Obama supporters 
were able to organize using Facebook groups in a short period of time in 2007). 
195 EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM 
284 (2011). 
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views that would find little or no welcome in the material world.196 The 
internet also empowers online the “thought vigilantism” that Rauch 
cautions against.197 Indeed, Rauch’s “speech posses” working online 
have the power to ruin lives.198 
When commercial internet technologies first arrived on the scene, 
the former president of PBS and NBC News presciently hypothesized 
a number of reasons to be skeptical of the internet’s democratizing 
effects, chief among them that mobs would one day police the 
information highways, creating a digital wild west: 
Looking at the content and character of the electronic media today, 
pessimists . . . distrust the judgment of the people at large who, as 
James Madison suggested, are too easily “misled by the artful 
misrepresentations of interested men” and “overcome by irregular 
passion.” . . . Whenever the public becomes directly engaged in a 
major controversial issue, the process of negotiation, compromise, 
and deliberation—the essence of effective policy making—becomes 
difficult if not impossible. . . . Competent decisions require not only 
thoughtful consideration and thorough deliberation but also 
complicated maneuvering through many divergent interests [that 
electronic media undercuts].199 
Due to the high volume of information that is transmitted via the 
internet, government actors can take inventory on a large scale of what 
they should be censoring. Thus, when the government does censor an 
online speaker, it can target the censorship in ways that large swaths of 
the population are unlikely to notice, in contrast to broad prohibitions 
196 See Luke O’Brien, The Making of an American Nazi, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2NYLGq0 (recounting the story of Andrew Anglin, “the publisher of the 
world’s biggest neo-Nazi website, The Daily Stormer”). 
197 RAUCH, supra note 168, at 23; see also Kevin D. Williamson, When the Twitter Mob 
Came for Me, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2018, 10:34 AM), https://on.wsj.com/2O1689X 
(describing the conservative author’s termination very shortly after his hire at The Atlantic, 
which resulted when the magazine’s progressive readers orchestrated an online smear 
campaign against him). But see Deena Zaru, Kanye West Criticizes Obama and Praises 
Trump: “The Mob Can’t Make Me Not Love Him,” CNN (Apr. 26, 2018, 8:11 AM), 
https://cnn.it/2O3so2T. 
198 See, e.g., Jon Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2NZuMI3. 
199 LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 171–72 (1995). Grossman also discusses “the increasingly 
distorting influence of money on the public dialogue; the dangerous growth of 
professionalism in politics and its apparently growing capacity to manage, manipulate, and 
exploit public opinion; the expanding role of special interest politics, and the ‘dumbing 
down,’ or debasing, of the standards of political information” as reasons to distrust a 
democratic cyberspace revolution. Id. at 182–89. 
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on speech, which many people would quickly identify as 
constitutionally problematic.200  
Even in the absence of government censorship and online mobs, 
“internet intermediaries” may nevertheless place their thumbs on the 
scale through alleged content throttling. If and when internet service 
providers interfere with the flow of information online by favoring their 
own content over their competitors’ content, it is less likely that 
“individuals [can] speak directly to mass audiences without having to 
rely on gatekeepers that had long determined the substance of media 
content.”201 Indeed, net neutrality proponents argue that regulation is 
necessary to preserving the free flow of information and to preventing 
intermediaries from throttling disfavored content.202 
Finally, it is theoretically intuitive that “[t]o be informed is to fulfill 
part of one’s civic duty . . . the informed citizen is the responsible 
200 MOROZOV, supra note 195, at 90–91, 100; cf. Paul Wiseman, Cracking the “Great 
Firewall” of China’s Web Censorship, ABC NEWS, https://abcn.ws/2O3AJn3 (Jan. 22, 
2019) (“To Americans and other Westerners, it might seem odd that Internet censorship is 
still possible at a time when YouTube, satellite TV and online chat rooms produce an 
overwhelming flow of real-time news and data. . . . No one does it quite like China, which 
has proved that old-school communist apparatchiks could tame something as wild as the 
Web.”). Government agencies can abuse internet platforms in other ways, too. For example, 
as Senior District Judge Jon P. McCalla recently ruled, the Memphis Police Department 
violated a 1978 consent decree with the ACLU by, among other things, creating fake 
Facebook profiles to “spy” on Black Lives Matter movement members. Phillip Jackson, 
Federal Judge Rules Memphis Police Violated Consent Decree After Spying on Protesters, 
COM. APPEAL (Oct. 26, 2018, 7:06 PM), http://bit.ly/2T5BxIZ; see also Letter from Andrea 
Kirkpatrick, Dir. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Sec., Facebook, to Michael Rallings, Dir., 
Memphis Police Dep’t (Sept. 19, 2018) (“We regard this activity as a breach of Facebook’s 
terms and policies, and as such we have disabled the fake accounts that we identified in our 
investigation.”), http://bit.ly/2F7x7xv. 
201 Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 697–98 (2010); accord GROSSMAN, supra note 
199, at 173–79 (warning against consolidation of new media ownership and predicting that 
“[t]he information superhighway will not be a freeway but an automated private toll road, 
traveled mostly by those who can afford to pay the price”); LISTER ET AL., supra note 183, 
at 180–81 (arguing that as long as “access to cyberspace remains a scarce resource, 
determined by economic and social power,” and malicious actors can exploit online tools 
for various forms of malfeasance, like harassment and spreading viruses, the internet is in 
no meaningful sense a democratic, public sphere). 
202 See, e.g., What Is Net Neutrality?, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://bit.ly/2F9izxA 
(last updated Dec. 2017). But see MOROZOV, supra note 195, at 215 (“Is there a secret plot 
by the world’s largest technology companies to restrict global freedom of expression? 
Probably not. The sheer amount of content uploaded to all these sites makes it impossible to 
administer them without making mistakes.”). 
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citizen, and the responsible citizen is an informed one.”203 However, 
according to some studies, increased information obtained online may 
not lead to a more informed citizenry and higher levels of meaningful 
political engagement in fact.204 Additionally, elected officials, 
bureaucrats, and citizen end users may have conflicting views of how 
to use technology to increase public engagement with government.205 
This is especially true when government actors use digital tools to try 
to shape public narratives about political, social, or economic issues 
when members of the public go online to participate in public debates 
and try to shape conversations themselves.206 
3. The Need for the Venable Rule in an Evolving Speech Paradigm
The commercial internet has changed the way we communicate and
interact on a daily basis, and society has much to gain from an 
unrestrained digital information economy. As Milton observed in the 
seventeenth century, European societies flourished because of 
England’s historical commitment to a dynamic information ecosystem 
in printed books.207 Today, too, courts have an opportunity to preserve 
a foundation for similarly great achievements resulting from the free 
exchange of ideas online. Courts should accordingly adapt free speech 
law to the evolving paradigm. Judges have, to some extent, successfully 
employed familiar legal tools to new technological phenomena.208 For 
203 BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 197, 217–24 (2003) (“The bottom line in this analysis is 
consistent with the psychological approach to information and behavior: The new 
information environment has not changed levels of political engagement in any substantial 
way. This analysis does leave the door open, though, to possible refinements as more data 
become available about the Internet and political behavior.”). 
204 See id. 
205 DARRELL M. WEST, DIGITAL GOVERNMENT: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
PERFORMANCE 10 (2005). 
206 See MOROZOV, supra note 195, at 116 (“Many early predictions about the Internet 
posited that it would rid the world of government propaganda. . . . Governments have 
learned that they can still manipulate online conversations by slightly adjusting how they 
manufacture and package their propaganda . . . .”); id. at 135 (“[A]uthoritarian governments 
have proved remarkably adept at shaping the direction, if not always the outcome, of most 
sensitive online conversations.”). 
207 See Milton, supra note 163. 
208 See, e.g., Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Indeed, 
the particular attributes of social media fit comfortably within the existing [Pickering-
Myers] balancing inquiry: A social media platform amplifies the distribution of the speaker’s 
message—which favors the employee’s free speech interests—but also increases the 
potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental disruption, thereby favoring the 
employer’s interest in efficiency. What matters to the First Amendment is not only the 
medium of the speech, but the scope and content of the restriction [on it].”). 
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example, a pair of recent district court rulings characterized online 
social networks as public forums in which the Free Speech Clause 
proscribes government officials from “blocking” followers on social 
media.209 Courts have also easily analyzed prophylactic prohibitions of 
certain kinds of online speech as vague or overbroad. For example, in 
Liverman v. City of Petersburg, the Fourth Circuit analyzed a police 
department’s social media policy that “prohibit[ed] in sweeping terms 
the dissemination of any information ‘that would tend to discredit or 
reflect unfavorably upon the [Department] . . .’” in light of overbreadth 
doctrine.210 
As the gap in the Pickering-Myers test demonstrates, however, some 
doctrinal elements of free speech jurisprudence must be modified in the 
digital age. Indeed, irrespective of what one thinks about the general 
virtues and vices of online information ecosystems, governments that 
use online tools are just as capable as hate groups of using digital tools 
for nefarious purposes. Of relevance to this Article, this author, who is 
not a member of the press, received a copy of the Venable 
Decommissioned Release by email, because Metro makes press 
releases available to anyone who wants to receive them that way.211 
Metro also posts its press releases online where anyone with an internet 
connection can see them.212 Metro therefore uses digital tools to 
communicate with the public directly, circumventing mainstream 
media filtering. Just as private citizens can use online tools to more 
effectively share information and organize, so can municipalities 
209 See generally Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. 
Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (ruling that President Trump blocking people from 
following the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account violates the First Amendment); Davison 
v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-cv-00932-JCC-IDD (E.D. Va. July 25, 2017)
(concluding that the chair of a local government body violated a plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights when she blocked him from her Facebook page for twelve hours). But see David
French, A Federal Judge Blocked Donald Trump from Blocking People on Twitter: Here’s
Why That’s Wrong, NAT’L REV. (May 23, 2018, 7:30 PM), http://bit.ly/2TwN5dD (refuting
Judge Naomi Buchwald’s designated-public-forum analysis of the Twitter platform in the
@realDonaldTrump blocking case).
210 844 F.3d at 404; see also id. at 408 (“Weighing the competing interests on either side 
of the . . . balance, we begin by noting the astonishing breadth of the social media policy’s 
language. The policy seeks to prohibit the dissemination of any information on social media 
‘that would tend to discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department].’” (alteration in 
original)). 
211 Email Updates, GOVDELIVERY.COM, http://bit.ly/2FbN469 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2018). 
212 Police Department Media Releases, NASHVILLE.GOV, http://bit.ly/2FbNh9r (last 
visited May 26, 2018). 
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organize the public against disfavored speakers. Organizing the public 
against a disfavored speaker to justify firing the speaker is dangerous 
to society to the extent that it sends offensive views underground, 
depriving the public of information it needs to self-govern 
effectively.213 Municipalities grappling with racial tensions and 
concerns over police officer safety may, like Metro, inevitably face 
temptations to violate their employees’ civil rights, using online tools 
to achieve the same speed and scale as the Arab Spring protesters 
enjoyed. 
At the risk of inviting thought vigilantism, a form of excess, the 
public must have all the facts to function effectively as a “cyberjury”214 
to achieve social progress when measuring the government’s 
performance. Therefore, courts should adopt the Venable Rule to 
protect the rights of terminated public employees who currently cannot 
speak on controversial topics for fear of retaliation under restrictive 
social media policies. Even if the employee’s utterance offends 
someone, or even a lot of people, as controversial speech will 
invariably do, it is important for the law to maintain the conditions that 
enable—rather than stifle—digitally enhanced self-government. 
While the philosophical and practical justifications for the Venable 
Rule are significant, the next Sections analyze various legal 
justifications to guide a court hearing an appropriate test case. 
C. Safeguarding Bedrock Free Speech Doctrines
The Constitution’s text and jurisprudence interpreting that text 
protect individual rights and liberties by constraining federal and state 
governments’ powers. For example, the Free Speech Clause 
recognizes—contrary to the relationship between the English 
aristocrats in the British Parliament and the common man—that the 
213 Cf. WEST, supra note 205, at 15. Partisan actors likewise face strong political 
incentives to deprive the public of information or methods of advocacy in other ways, a 
softer form of thought vigilantism. Id. at 42 (describing how the George W. Bush 
administration altered and deleted information about abortion from government websites 
because it offended Congressional conservatives and abstinence-only advocacy groups); see 
also, e.g., Eli Rosenberg, Donald Trump’s White House Shuts Down Obama-Era Petition 
Site Without Answering a Single One, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 20, 2017, 11:47 AM), 
https://ind.pn/2Tye8oY. 
214 Nancy S. Marder, Cyberjuries: A Model of Deliberative Democracy?, in 
DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE 
INTERNET 35 (Peter M. Shane ed. 2004); see also Jason Barabas, Virtual Deliberation: 
Knowledge from Online Interaction Versus Ordinary Discussion, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: 
THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE INTERNET 239 (Peter M. Shane, 
ed. 2004). 
2019] Purged by Press Release: First Responders, Free Speech, 525 
and Public Employment Retaliation in the Digital Age
American people are sovereign and have power to “censor” the 
government, not the other way around.215 It also recognizes that the 
right to speak preexists the ratification of the Constitution.216 During 
the initial ratifying conventions between 1787 and 1789, Anti-
Federalists were highly skeptical that the new Constitution would 
safeguard the preexisting, sacrosanct freedoms of speech and press that 
state constitutions already protected.217 When Pennsylvanians later 
ratified the Federal Constitution, convention-goer Samuel Bryan 
penned a statement of dissent citing the widespread Anti-Federalist 
grievance that the new Constitution did not expressly protect the right 
to speak from congressional interference. The stringent, mandatory 
language that Bryan used to describe the Anti-Federalist proposal at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention foreshadowed the mandatory 
language that the First Amendment later used in stark contrast to the 
broad, sweeping investiture of legislative power in Congress in Article 
I’s elastic clause.218 Thus, it is difficult to overstate how powerfully the 
215 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 103 (2005). 
216 See id. at 316; John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 
(1993) (“I emphasize the word ‘the’ as used in the term ‘the freedom of speech’ because the 
definite article suggests that the draftsmen intended to immunize a previously identified 
category or subset of speech.”). 
217 See, e.g., Samuel Bryan, “Centinel,” Number 1, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND COMPROMISES 
THAT GAVE BIRTH TO OUR GOVERNMENT 232, 232–33 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (1787) 
(discussing the impact the new amendment-less national Constitution could have on 
Pennsylvania’s state constitutional protections of speech and press if Pennsylvanians ratified 
it). 
218 See Samuel Bryan, The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the 
Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND COMPROMISES THAT 
GAVE BIRTH TO OUR GOVERNMENT 243, 245–46 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (1787) (“We 
offered our objections to the convention, and opposed those parts of the plan, which, in our 
opinion, would be injurious to you, in the best manner we were able; and closed our 
arguments by offering the following propositions to the convention. . . . That the people 
have a right to the freedom of speech, of writing and publishing their sentiments, therefore, 
the freedom of the press shall not be restrained by any law of the United States.”); see also 
AMAR, supra note 215, at 319 (noting that, whereas the Necessary and Proper Clause vests 
Congress with power to “make all Laws” that it deems necessary and proper to carry out its 
other Article I, Section 8 powers, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause expressly 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” (emphasis 
added)). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, with U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
526 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 477 
Free Speech Clause cabins Congress’s powers (and later the states’ 
powers)219 with respect to this preexisting right. 
But the right to speak is not limitless. In a case about a Jehovah’s 
Witness preaching in the street who called a policeman a “fascist” for 
failing to protect him from a violent mob, Justice Frank Murphy 
reminded the nation that 
it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all 
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of 
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. 
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or “fighting” words—those by which their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.220 
Similarly, in one of the most oft-misquoted, misunderstood, and 
misapplied passages in all of free-speech debate, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes quipped, “The most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
219 Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that 
freedom of speech . . . [is] among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
220 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (emphasis added). 
Coincidentally, some of the most significant free speech victories in history came from a set 
of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases that all involved Jehovah’s Witness 
plaintiffs who had said or done something that offended people of more mainstream spiritual 
or secular persuasions. See, e.g., id. at 568; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940); John E. Mulder & Marvin Comisky, Jehovah’s Witnesses Mold 
Constitutional Law, 2 BILL OF RTS. REV. 262, 262 (1942) (“Seldom, if ever, in the past, has 
one individual or group been able to shape the course, over a period of time, of any phase 
of our vast body of constitutional law. But it can happen, and it has happened, here. The 
group is Jehovah’s Witnesses. Through almost constant litigation this organization has made 
possible an ever-increasing list of precedents concerning the application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to freedom of speech and religion.”). In one case involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses from this period, however, the Court ruled 8–1 against a pair of minor school 
children who were expelled from public school for refusing to salute the American flag 
during the pledge of allegiance because to do so would have violated their religious 
consciences. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92 (1940), overruled by 
W. Va. Bd. of Ed. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“The decision of this Court in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few per curiam decisions
which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled . . . .”). Their lawyer, Hayden C.
Covington, became a Jehovah’s Witness himself after finishing law school en route to
becoming one of the most prolific civil rights attorneys in American history. Interview, Full
Text of “Hayden C. Covington Interview,” ARCHIVE.ORG, http://bit.ly/2F8jGO6 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2019).
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causing a panic.”221 Free-speech case law thus abounds with balancing 
tests,222 and as the Pickering-Myers test demonstrates, the public has a 
strong interest in protecting everyone’s speech rights—even (and 
especially) when we dislike what they say.223 This trend in free speech 
law reflects the notion that a vibrant marketplace of ideas has always 
undergirded American democracy.224 The law’s default posture 
disfavors government actions that chill speech.225 Indeed, as the Court 
recognized in Myers, speech on matters of truly public concern—
speech that is “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community”—“falls within the core of 
First Amendment protection.”226 These interests are so strong that two 
commentators have argued that the Free Speech Clause should also 
support a common-law “public policy exception” to even private-
sector, at-will employment retaliations for whistleblowing.227 
221 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Ken White, Three Generations of 
a Hackneyed Apologia for Censorship Are Enough, POPEHAT (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://bit.ly/2TygkN3. Of course, if a theater erupted into flames, and it happened to be 
crowded, not only would the First Amendment protect someone who yelled, “FIRE!” from 
liability for inciting a panic, but society would arguably want such a person to so interject 
to promote personal safety and alert firefighters to the need to try to preserve commercial 
property. 
222 Although many balancing tests exist to determine whether a challenged action 
violates the Free Speech Clause, the Court recently expressly declined to adopt “a free-
floating [balancing] test” that would empower it to add new categories of prohibited speech 
on an ongoing basis if “the value of the speech [outweighs] its societal costs.” See United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–71 (2010). 
223 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) (“The inappropriate or 
controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a 
matter of public concern.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“Debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”). 
224 See supra Part IV Section A. 
225 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The right of citizens to 
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to 
enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”); N.Y. Times Co., 376 
U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring) (“An unconditional right to say what one pleases about 
public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.”); 
cf. Steven J. Mulroy & Amy H. Moorman, Raising the Floor of Company Conduct: Deriving 
Public from the Constitution in an Employment-at-Will Arena, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 
988 (2014) (“It is the very first right listed in the Bill of Rights. . . . [t]here is no individual 
right more celebrated in the United States.”). 
226 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008) (emphasis added). 
227 See generally Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 225, at 979–92 (analyzing compelled 
speech, whistleblowing, statutory protections for employee speech, and how to balance an 
employer’s interests against society’s interests and a speaker’s interests). 
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The gap in free-speech jurisprudence that the Venable Case unearths 
rationally incentivizes municipal employers to commit one or both of 
two constitutional errors: either (1) punish employees on the basis of 
the content of their speech, which the Constitution forbids for any other 
private citizen speaking on a matter of public concern, unless the 
restriction survives strict scrutiny228 or (2) censor a particular 
viewpoint, which the Constitution also forbids for any other private 
speaker.229 The Free Speech Clause needs a helping hand to prevent 
these abuses in the public employment retaliation context;230 the 
proposed Venable Rule would help deter civil rights violations by 
undermining governments’ defenses to § 1983 employment retaliation 
228 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based laws—those 
that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional 
and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve 
compelling state interests.”). But see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 118 (2001) (citing LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (1978)) (“Under the doctrine of content neutrality, speech 
regulations that are not motivated by the content of speech may be subjected to a lesser 
standard of judicial scrutiny.”). Some measure of content-based discrimination is inevitable 
where a municipal employer satisfies strict scrutiny under the Pickering-Myers test. 
Additionally, courts have traditionally given wider latitude to content-based restrictions 
when government defendants have acted as employers instead of as sovereigns. DAVID L. 
HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:1 (2012). Because of the 
weighty public interest in vibrant marketplace of ideas, however, courts should take great 
pains to curtail the kind of content-based discrimination-by-press release that seems to have 
occurred in the Venable Case. 
229 Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
804 (1984) (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that 
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense others.”). Some speech, in other words, is not 
“more equal than” other speech in the eyes of the law. Cf. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 
112 (1946) (“ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE 
EQUAL THAN OTHERS.”). As with content-based discrimination, some measure of 
viewpoint discrimination will inevitably occur. That does not mean that courts should 
abdicate their duty to enforce the Constitution’s guarantees when a public employer 
impermissibly violates an employee’s rights. See Clark Neily, Judicial Engagement Means 
No More Make-Believe Judging, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1054, 1070 (2012) (“Judicial 
engagement rejects the premise that it is appropriate for judges to make a genuine effort to 
police the constitutional bounds of government power in some cases but not in others. 
Judicial engagement calls for commitment and consistency in reviewing constitutional 
challenges to government power and an end to judicial abdication in the form of make-
believe judging.”); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329 (“Indeed, a court would be 
remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the 
necessity of making a broader ruling.”). But see Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 
740, 749–50 (1961) (applying the avoidance canon to a First Amendment challenge to the 
Railway Labor Act and declining to resolve the question on constitutional grounds). 
230 Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”). 
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actions with proof that the government’s republication of speech—not 
the speaker’s initial utterance—caused the workplace disruption that 
harmed the municipality’s ability to efficiently deliver public services. 
Doctrines outside constitutional law, and the policy rationales 
underlying them, also provide compelling reasons for courts to adopt 
the Venable Rule, as the next Section demonstrates. 
D. Alternative Theoretical Justifications
For several reasons and in several contexts, the law already disfavors 
giving shelter or relief to litigants who have helped create a dispute or 
controversy, or who act in a way as to seriously prejudice the opposing 
litigant. The following subsections analyze just a few of these doctrines 
and demonstrate how each provides a rationale for courts to fashion 
and adopt the Venable Rule for use in adjudicating retaliation claims 
arising from facts analogous to the Venable Case. 
1. Unclean Hands
The law of remedies provides a starting point. Specifically, the
rationale underlying the equitable defense of unclean hands, which 
“operate[s] in limine to bar the suitor from invoking the aid of the 
equity court,”231 provides the first alternative justification for the 
Venable Rule. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment explains, in pertinent part, that “[r]ecovery in restitution to 
which an innocent claimant would be entitled may be limited or denied 
because of the claimant’s inequitable conduct in the transaction that is 
the source of the asserted liability.”232 
The policy of the doctrine of unclean hands is to curtail conduct that 
offends the court—not necessarily for the benefit of the party asserting 
the defense, but because to grant relief to a party with unclean hands 
with respect to a particular matter before the court (“not collateral to 
it”) would risk undermining the court’s very legitimacy.233 The 
offending conduct must be “egregious” and “can take the form of ‘. . . 
bad faith.’”234 The doctrine of unclean hands does not require that a 
231 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995). 
232 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 63 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011). 
233 See ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 190 (6th ed. 
2016). 
234 Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 515 F. Supp. 2d 509, 531 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(quoting S&R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int’l, 968 F.2d 371, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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litigant be pure as the driven snow, but “it does require that [suitors] 
shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy 
in issue.”235 That the litigant against whom an opponent invokes the 
doctrine has “dirty” hands is not dispositive. Rather, how or when he 
dirtied them is determinative: if “he dirtied them in acquiring the right 
he now asserts, or [if] the manner of dirtying renders inequitable the 
assertion of such rights,” then the doctrine applies.236 The doctrine 
plays such an important role in promoting fair public policies and 
safeguarding a court’s legitimacy that the law of equity confers broad 
discretion on courts to invoke the doctrine, even sua sponte.237 This 
amount of discretion is indeed powerful: 
The governing principle is “that whenever a party who, as actor, 
seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain some 
remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other equitable 
principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the court will be shut 
against him in limine; the court will refuse to interfere on his behalf, 
to acknowledge his right, or to award him any remedy.”238 
In purporting to justify its termination of Venable by claiming that 
his Facebook comment disrupted the efficient delivery of public 
services, Metro asks a reviewing court, in effect, to excuse de facto 
censorship that would otherwise be a violation of Venable’s rights.239 
However, if Metro has unclean hands because it helped create the 
workplace disruption by issuing a press release in bad faith, it should 
not, by way of analogy, receive such a blessing. No court should deny 
relief to a § 1983 employment retaliation plaintiff in a free-speech 
action in which the government employer manufactured the very 
disruption in the workplace that it later invoked to justify an adverse 
employment action. To do so would make a mockery of the judicial 
system, and courts have strong interests in preserving their legitimacy. 
Indeed, any court that would sanction the firing of a public employee 
235 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814–15 
(1945). 
236 Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1963). 
237 Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Highmark, Inc. v. 
UPMC Health Plan, 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001)) (“The doctrine [of unclean hands] 
may be raised sua sponte . . . .”); Fenn v. Yale Univ., 283 F. Supp. 2d 615, 635 (D. Conn. 
2003) (quoting Thompson v. Orcutt, 756 A.2d 332, 334 (Conn. 2000)) (“The trial court 
enjoys broad discretion in determining whether the promotion of public policy and the 
preservation of the courts’ integrity dictate that the [un]clean hands doctrine is invoked.”). 
238 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244–45 (1933) (quoting 
J. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397 (4th ed. 1905)).
239 Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968). 
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for speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, without 
taking the most critical view possible of a defendant municipal 
employer’s disruption defense by holding an evidentiary hearing that 
gives the speaker and employer an opportunity to put on proof of who 
caused the disruption, risks its own credibility as “an impenetrable 
bulwark”240 against executive overreach. The Venable Rule embraces 
the reasoning underlying the doctrine of unclean hands by affording a 
public employment retaliation plaintiff an opportunity to rebut a 
municipal defendant’s disruption evidence with evidence of the 
municipality’s bad-faith, inequitable conduct. 
If courts find analogies to the law of equity unpersuasive in weighing 
evidence or interpreting the totality of circumstances in public 
employment retaliation litigation, however, then perhaps analogizing 
to legal remedial doctrines will provide firmer footing. 
2. Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault
The law of damages in tort provides another lens through which to
analyze the Venable Rule: contributory negligence and comparative 
fault. At common law, even a small portion of fault on the plaintiff’s 
part would completely bar recovery in a tort.241 Judicial application of 
contributory negligence led to harsh outcomes.242 As a result, nearly 
all jurisdictions in the United States have since adopted some variant 
of a comparative-fault system that apportions damages to parties in a 
negligence action, expressed as a percentage, commensurate with 
whatever level of fault the fact finder attributes to each litigant.243 Fact 
finders’ identification and apportionment of fault in tort cases suggest 
that people can recognize when a municipality seeks to shift the blame 
for its adverse employment actions to a speaker when the municipality 
is in fact responsible for the harm that purportedly justified the adverse 
action. 
In cases like the Venable Case, the law should be as harsh as the 
common law contributory negligence approach for two chief reasons. 
240 James Madison, House of Representatives, U. CHI. (June 8, 1789), 
http://bit.ly/2F9oSkP (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
241 McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1992). 
242 Id. at 57. 
243 Id. For example, Tennessee embraces the “49 percent rule,” which permits recovery 
so long as a plaintiff’s overall proportion of fault in causing her injury was less than the 
defendant’s. Id. Oregon has a slightly more generous rule, permitting recovery as long as 
the plaintiff’s share of fault was not more than the defendant’s. See, e.g., Towe v. 
Sacagawea, Inc., 347 P.3d 766, 786 (Or. 2015). 
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First, right to free speech as we know it was born of the common 
law.244 Second, because speech rights are so fundamental and essential 
to safeguarding the promises of a democratic society,245 neither courts 
nor the law should tolerate governmental conduct that manipulates 
prevailing free speech doctrines for its own ends. The severity of the 
common law approach to contributory negligence is a feature here, not 
a bug. The harsher approach recognizes that municipal employers can 
be as much or more at fault than a terminated employee for any 
workplace disruption that ostensibly arises from the former employee’s 
offensive speech. It also employs a capable fact finder in the 
evidentiary hearing—the court—to apportion fault to the governmental 
employer for its role in creating the dispute. 
In the event this analogy to a common law legal remedial doctrine 
does not persuade the courts, perhaps an analogy to a remedial rule in 
criminal procedure will suffice as further support for the Venable Rule. 
After all, remedies in criminal matters strive to preserve justice and 
fairness when cases implicate constitutional issues. 
3. The Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule bars a prosecutor’s use of evidence in his or
her case in chief that police obtained in violation of a defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
244 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151 (“Every freeman has an undoubted 
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy . . . 
freedom.”); Crown v. John Peter Zenger, HIST. SOC’Y N.Y. CTS., http://bit.ly/2TA3KwT 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (recounting a colonial-era seditious libel case that “influenced 
how people thought about [free speech] and led, many decades later, to the protections 
embodied in the United States Constitution [and] the Bill of Rights”). Cf. Richard A. 
Epstein, Common Law for the First Amendment, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7–21 
(2018) (propounding a theoretical framework for protecting free speech in the absence of 
the First Amendment). 
245 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (“Freedom of press, freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.”); see also NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 
(1980)) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has always rested on 
the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 14–15 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates 
are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.”); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (“An 
unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the 
minimum guarantee of the First Amendment.”). Interested readers should indulge 
themselves in Jacob Mchangama’s excellent new podcast, Clear and Present 
Danger: A History of Free Speech, FREE SPEECH HISTORY (download at 
http://bit.ly/2Fa8wZ9), in which he traces the role of speech in Western civilization going 
all the way back to ancient Athens. 
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seizures.246 The exclusionary rule’s “purpose is to deter [violations]—
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective 
way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.”247 The law should not 
permit government entities to make out their criminal cases by 
violating defendants’ civil rights; thus, courts colorfully liken illicitly 
obtained evidence in a criminal case to “fruit of the poisonous tree.”248 
Excluding evidence to deter constitutional violations through judge-
made law is one important way that courts check the excesses of the 
political branches.249 
The exclusionary rule, however, is not absolute. It does not spring 
from the roots of constitutional text,250 nor does it create an 
independent right for criminal defendants. The late Justice Scalia 
described the limits of the rule as follows: 
Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, 
not our first impulse. . . . We have rejected “[i]ndiscriminate 
application” of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only “where 
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,”—that 
is, “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social 
costs.’”251 
Five years later, Justice Alito echoed this balancing test, again noting 
the extreme nature of the remedy of excluding evidence from 
admission in a prosecutor’s case in chief in a criminal trial: 
Real deterrent value is a “necessary condition for exclusion,” but it is 
not “a sufficient” one. The analysis must also account for the 
246 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397–98 (1914). Because the exclusionary 
rule is meant to deter violations of defendant’s constitutional rights, exclusion of evidence 
is unnecessary where police act in good faith; one cannot practically deter a violation 
resulting from good-faith conduct. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring in the judgment)) 
(“Nevertheless, the balancing approach that has evolved in various contexts—including 
criminal trials—‘forcefully [suggests] that the exclusionary rule be more generally modified 
to permit the introduction of evidence obtained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a 
search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment.’”). 
247 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
248 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). 
249 Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (“Nothing can destroy a government 
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter 
of its own existence.”). But see Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009) (quoting 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908) (“The principal cost of applying the rule is, of course, letting guilty 
and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something that offends ‘basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system.’”). 
250 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
251 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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“substantial social costs” generated by the rule. Exclusion exacts a 
heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large. . . . Our 
cases hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, 
but only as a “last resort.”252 
Courts thus limit application of the exclusionary rule to 
unconstitutional conduct that is “sufficiently deliberate,” unlike a 
good-faith mistake,253 such that exclusion will serve its deterrent 
function.254 
One well-known exception to the exclusionary rule—the 
“independent source” doctrine—permits prosecutors to admit 
evidence, even where law enforcement officers commit a Fourth 
Amendment violation, if the officers obtain the evidence by some 
other, nonviolative means.255 The Court announced this exception in 
Murray v. United States256: 
Knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly 
acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at 
the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if that later acquisition 
was not the result of the earlier entry there is no reason why the 
independent source doctrine should not apply. Invoking the 
exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in 
the same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred, 
but in a worse one.257 
Under this reasoning, prosecutors should be able to introduce evidence 
of a crime if there is a legitimate basis for police obtaining it, 
notwithstanding that the police also committed a constitutional 
violation. 
The Venable Rule, like the exclusionary rule, would call a 
municipality to account for using evidence of workplace or service-
delivery disruption when it, in fact, created the disruption—not the 
terminated employee. The rationale for the Venable Rule, like the 
252 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
253 See supra note 246. 
254 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must 
be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable 
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system [in excluding otherwise 
admissible, relevant evidence].”); United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 497 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(applying the Herring deliberateness doctrine). 
255 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (permitting the admission of evidence 
of marijuana trafficking obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant even though police 
officers had previously done a “sneak and peek” investigation in violation of the defendants’ 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 541. 
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exclusionary rule, is deterrence. Deterrence is especially important 
where the government employer has a rational incentive to use such 
evidence to justify terminating an employee for offensive speech, as 
the exclusionary rule is when zealous police officers and prosecutors 
act on rational incentives to use their illicitly obtained evidence to make 
their criminal cases as strong and expedient as possible.  
If a public employee filed a retaliation suit under § 1983 after being 
fired for speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern in 
a digital forum, and the municipality invoked the disruption defense 
under the Pickering-Myers framework, the Venable Rule requires an 
evidentiary hearing. In that hearing, the employer would be required to 
mount proof of an actual disruption to public services, and the plaintiff 
would have an opportunity to rebut the municipality’s disruption 
defense by submitting evidence that the municipality created the 
disruption by using digital tools to issue a press release and shape 
public opinion about the speaker. If the plaintiff successfully made such 
a showing, then the court should conclude as a matter of law that a 
constitutional violation occurred.258 A legal conclusion that the 
municipality violated the plaintiff’s right to speak would both satisfy 
the second step of the plaintiff’s prima facie § 1983 case and, as with 
application of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation 
of a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, provide a basis for 
ordering the deterrent remedy of excluding the defendant 
municipality’s disruption evidence. In this way, the Venable Rule 
would deter municipalities from manufacturing politically convenient 
crises of public opinion or workplace morale by depriving them of a 
defense to a retaliation claim,259 and make the full panoply of statutory 
258 Before courts apply the exclusionary rule in a criminal case, it must conclude as a 
matter of law that law enforcement officers violated the Constitution to obtain evidence. 
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397–98 (1914). Issuing a press release does 
not conjure an image of a typical employment action like suspension, demotion, docking of 
pay, transfer, or termination. However, if a municipality’s defense to a retaliation claim 
hinges on its proof of a disruption to the efficient delivery of public services, then a court 
should consider the actions that the municipality took before a disruption occurs—
marshalling public administrative resources to exert public pressure on an employee—as 
adverse employment actions. See also, e.g., supra Part IV Section B (discussing rationales 
for expanding the scope of speech protections in the digital age). 
259 Justice Scalia also noted in his opinion for the Court in Hudson that § 1983 and 
Bivens actions obviate the need for the exclusionary rule for every constitutional violation. 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006). Thus, applying the Venable Rule would 
both embrace one of the chief policy rationales of the exclusionary rule while employing 
one of the Court’s proposed alternatives to it: a fully litigated civil rights claim. 
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remedies available to a retaliation plaintiff to enforce his rights.260 
Moreover, applying the Venable Rule, like applying the exclusionary 
rule, would also help the judiciary preserve its own legitimacy within 
the broader constitutional structure by imposing checks in the 
executive.261 
Finally, consistent with the limits of the exclusionary rule, the 
Venable Rule effectively balances the public’s interests in deterring 
constitutional violations against social costs. It would curtail the 
excesses of municipal employers, whom the status quo rationally 
incentivizes to take adverse employment actions against an employee 
who utters offensive speech, while avoiding the constitutional injury 
that results instantly from curbing free speech.262 A court fashioning 
and applying the Venable Rule could also find comfort in the rationale 
of the independent source doctrine. Analogizing to this doctrine would 
permit a termination where the government employer has issued a press 
release, but it can also put on sufficient evidence of a workplace 
disruption that results organically from the offending speech—an 
independent source. That is, even if, in the evidentiary hearing created 
by the Venable Rule, the plaintiff demonstrated that the municipality 
used digital tools to republish the offensive speech in a press release to 
shape public opinion about him before firing him, the disruption 
defense would still be available to the municipality if it showed, 
notwithstanding its public relations efforts, that the disruption came 
from an independent source of sociocultural angst. Such proof from the 
municipality would militate against a conclusion of law that a 
constitutional violation had occurred, both negating the second step of 
the § 1983 prima facie case and ruling out exclusion as a necessary 
deterrent. 
While well-grounded rationales for the Venable Rule exist in these 
analogies, a tension persists. That tension arises from municipal 
employers’ interest in firing first responders who say offensive things. 
The next Section acknowledges, analyzes, and addresses this interest. 
260 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988 (2012) (providing damages to civil rights plaintiffs). 
261 Cf. Madison, supra note 240. 
262 Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First 
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury.”). Although it strains credulity to think that mere utterances could result 
in measurable harm of any kind to a listener, the record in the Venable Case is conspicuously 
devoid of any evidence of any cost to society resulting from Venable’s speech. See generally 
Anderson Letter, supra note 21. Chief Anderson’s letter certainly blamed Venable for a 
spontaneous protest, but the city’s issuance of a press release prior to the protest 
demonstrates how truly disingenuous this line of attack really was. See supra Part III. 
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E. Counterarguments from the Municipality’s Interest
Metro undoubtedly had several incentives to terminate Venable for 
his obtuse, out-of-touch, and, frankly, insensitive remark about the fatal 
shooting of Philando Castile. Four of the pressures that Metro and 
Chief Anderson might have faced in the Venable Case include potential 
liability for police misconduct or a hostile work environment, the 
appearance of neutrality in service delivery, and political 
considerations. The following subsections critically analyze each of 
these incentives and explain why courts should nevertheless adopt the 
Venable Rule in public employment retaliation cases with facts like the 
Venable Case. 
1. Liability for Police Misconduct
Chief Anderson’s letter made a curiously bold claim to justify
terminating Venable: “The Metropolitan Government would also face 
liability for retaining an officer” who said what Venable wrote on 
Facebook.263 Although Venable would ostensibly premise a § 1983 
case on the “official policy” species of municipal liability, Metro and 
Chief Anderson may have been worried about the “unofficial policy or 
custom” variant of municipal liability.264 In Brandon v. Holt,265 for 
example, the Supreme Court denied immunity to the City of Memphis 
in a § 1983 case when Robert Allen, an officer with “a history of violent 
and irregular behavior that was well known within the Police 
Department,” brutally beat up and stabbed a teenager without 
263 Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 4. 
264 Under this theory of liability, a § 1983 plaintiff can recover from a municipality with 
a showing that an informal, yet city-sanctioned, policy or custom of tolerating civil rights 
violations caused some harm. “Customs” for this purpose include “persistent and 
widespread . . . practices of [municipal] officials” that, “[a]lthough not authorized by written 
law . . . could . . . be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with 
the force of law.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (quoting Adickes 
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). So
Metro may have been worried that, if Venable ever did unjustifiably shoot a suspect, its
failure to punish him for his insensitive remark could be used as evidence that it tolerated
police brutality in a manner “with the force of law.” See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (discussing, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)
(plurality opinion); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821, 830–31 & n.5 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633, 655 & n.39
(1980)) (providing that certain “unjustified” acts of police officers, “without more,” will not
give rise to liability).
265 469 U.S. 464 (1985). 
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provocation.266 In effect, the Court’s holding allowed the plaintiff to 
recover damages directly from the city because the director of the 
police department “should have known that Officer Allen’s dangerous 
propensities created a threat to the rights and safety of citizens.”267 
Brandon is arguably inapposite to the Venable Case, however, 
because Venable did not actually unjustifiably shoot any criminal 
suspects five times as opposed to four—or even once. In Brandon, 
Robert Allen, an officer with a well-documented, violent history 
stabbed a citizen without provocation. Venable, in contrast, had no 
history of a violent past. There is a strong correlation between Robert 
Allen’s physically violent past and the physical violence he perpetrated 
on the plaintiffs in Brandon. The Memphis Police Department should 
have been able to predict Allen’s actions, based on his record, and fired 
him before he violated anyone’s rights to personal safety. Conversely, 
Venable’s lone Facebook comment about whether to use lethal force in 
a police encounter with a criminal suspect does not portend a physically 
violent episode, and it does not warrant prophylactically terminating 
him to avoid creating an unofficial custom of municipally sanctioned 
police brutality. 
Moreover, Brandon was a § 1983 claim based on the plaintiff’s 
constitutional right to his bodily integrity that Robert Allen summarily 
violated when he beat and stabbed the plaintiff.268 Citizens of 
Nashville, by contrast, have no constitutional right to not be 
offended,269 so no Brandon problem exists as to Venable’s Facebook 
comment. 
One might argue that, like Robert Allen’s “history of violent and 
irregular behavior,” Venable’s crass comment gave Metro notice that 
he would one day shoot an African-American suspect with excessive 
force, and thus Metro fired Venable preemptively to avoid civil rights 
litigation that would invariably ensue. But on the facts of the Venable 
Case, in which a police officer used poor judgment online one day in 
contrast to his multiyear meritorious service record, this argument 
seems like a stretch, to say the least. At any rate, without more, 
266 Id. at 466. For a more gruesome account of the facts of the case, see Brandon v. Allen, 
516 F. Supp. 1355, 1357–59 (W.D. Tenn. 1981), for the trial court’s recitation of the 
incident. 
267 Holt, 469 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation omitted). 
268 Id. at 464.  
269 “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (collecting 
cases). 
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Nashvillians have no cognizable legal interest in not being offended 
that is so weighty as to permit censorship of Venable’s speech, even if 
Metro had a reason to believe Venable might one day publish an off-
color remark on Facebook. 
But this conclusion alone does not mean that Metro had no 
legitimate interests in firing Venable. Public employers are not only 
accountable to their customers and constituents under the law; they are 
also accountable to other employees. 
2. Liability for a Hostile Work Environment
Metro had a legitimate interest in reducing its exposure to liability
for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VII, 
an employer can be held liable if it has, or should have had, knowledge 
of behavior that creates a hostile work environment. A hostile work 
environment manifests when: (1) a subordinate employee does or says 
something discriminatory to, or in the presence of, another subordinate 
employee,270 (2) the offending conduct is severe or pervasive enough 
to “alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 
abusive working environment,”271 and (3) the employer fails to 
remediate the situation.272 Under this framework, federal law holds the 
employer liable for the discriminatory conduct of the subordinate 
employee. The standard of proof in a case alleging a hostile work 
environment can be high: the less severe the offending conduct is, the 
more pervasive it must be for a claimant to prevail.273 Similarly, the 
less pervasive the conduct is, the more severe it must be for a Title VII 
plaintiff to meet his burden.274 Once a Title VII plaintiff prevails on a 
claim for a hostile work environment, he is entitled to a broad swath of 
statutory remedies, including damages.275 Therefore, a municipal 
employer, which is also a steward of the public trust, may be even more 
270 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).  
271 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). 
272 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2017) (“[A]n employer is responsible for acts of sexual 
harassment in the workplace where the employer . . . knows or should have known of the 
conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” 
(emphasis added)). 
273 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. 
274 See id. 
275 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b), 2000e-5(g) (2012). 
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likely to fire a subordinate employee for offensive speech to avoid 
paying a judgment in a Title VII case. 
If one of Venable’s colleagues alleged a claim under Title VII over 
Venable’s comment, however, the colleague would need to surmount a 
high barrier to demonstrate that one comment in isolation, which 
Venable asserts was a sarcastic joke, was severe enough to create a 
hostile work environment.276 In addition, standards of decency 
presumably both evolve over time and vary from place to place.277 As 
several commentators have noted, this evidentiary analysis also belies 
the problematic legal tension between Title VII liability and the Free 
Speech Clause.278 Absent a showing of severity, the colleague would 
need to show pervasiveness of the offending speech beyond a single 
Facebook comment, which seems highly unlikely. By giving a 
terminated employee an opportunity to offer proof that the employer’s 
press release made a single offensive utterance pervasive—thus, 
actionable under Title VII—applying the Venable Rule would protect 
a subordinate employee’s speech rights while directing the force of the 
Title VII case to the proper defendant: the municipality that made the 
speech pervasive by republishing it and ipso facto failing to remediate 
its effects on other subordinate employees. 
Because it is unclear whether one of Venable’s colleagues could 
meet his or her burden of proof for a hostile work environment claim, 
Metro may or may not have had a justifiable interest in shielding itself 
from liability under Title VII by firing him. Nevertheless, Metro has 
practical interests that it may have considered in a Pickering-Myers 
analysis of the constitutionality of disciplining Venable. 
276 In one very recent case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, 
where Nashville is located, the Court denied a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII 
case alleging a hostile work environment over a single use of the “n-word.” See John P. 
Rodgers, Once Is Enough: Tennessee Federal Court Rules Single Use of “N-Word” by Co-
Worker Sufficient to Get Hostile Work Environment Claim to Jury, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2019), http://bit.ly/2TA41jp. Venable did not use such a racial slur in his 
Facebook comment, but the law of the Sixth Circuit may yet be changing in this area. 
277 De gustibus non est disputdandum, as the ancient Latin maxim goes. Cf. Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
278 See, e.g., DAVID BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT!: THE GROWING THREAT TO 
CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 23–34 (2003) (criticizing Title VII’s 
threat to free speech); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 
RUTGERS L. REV. 563 (1995); Jonathan Rauch, Offices and Gentlemen, NEW REPUBLIC, 
June 23, 1997, http://bit.ly/2F9hqGc. But see J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile 
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310 (1999) (“[A] person trapped in a hostile work 
environment is a ‘captive audience’ for First Amendment purposes with respect to the 
speech and conduct that produce the discrimination.”). 
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3. Appearance of Neutrality in Service Delivery
Cities have strong interests in distancing themselves from their
employees’ controversial views. This is especially true regarding first 
responders because “first responders . . . require the public’s complete 
trust that they will discharge their duties faithfully and impartially 
without regard to factors like a person’s race, gender or sexual 
orientation.”279 Simply put, nobody should have to worry when 
Venable arrives on the scene of an alleged crime that he would 
arbitrarily shoot them five times. Failing to punish controversial speech 
may constitute ratification of behavior, thus giving rise to municipal 
liability under § 1983.280 Such a failure may also establish an official 
policy or custom of encouraging private actors to discriminate against 
racial minorities.281 
Furthermore, as technological innovation and digital penetration 
continue to blur the dividing line between public and private spheres, 
the Court may—although it has not done so yet—revisit the distinctions 
it drew in Pickering and Garcetti between a person who speaks as a 
private citizen versus as a public employee. The Court may yet reject 
this distinction as a legal fiction when, in the digital age, there really 
may be no such thing as a public employee speaking as a truly private 
citizen. Under such a framework, a municipality could separate itself 
from offensive viewpoints by firing someone without violating the 
person’s rights in any case. 
But there may yet be some “social value”282 to Venable’s remarks, 
precisely because of, rather than in spite of, how offensive they 
279 Hudson, supra note 11. 
280 Cf. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (“If the authorized 
policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would 
be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.”). Here again, however, the 
officer’s speech would need to violate citizens’ constitutional rights to hold a municipality 
liable under § 1983. It is doubtful that this would ever be the case, as citizens have no 
constitutional right not to be offended. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) 
(collecting cases). 
281 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (“We hold that 
municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to 
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.”). In 
Lombard v. Louisiana, for example, the mayor’s public comments about lunch counter sit-
ins could establish an “official policy” because the Mayor may have had final decision-
making authority. See 373 U.S. 267, 270–74 (1963). Therefore, the defendants in Lombard 
could bring a § 1983 action against the city of New Orleans. 
282 But see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“It has been well 
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
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were.283 If one takes Venable at his word, that he was replying in a 
mocking fashion to what he perceived to be overblown outrage to the 
Castile shooting coming from people who had never walked a 
proverbial mile in a police officer’s shoes,284 then one could view his 
sarcasm as an attempt to educate the other online commenters with the 
rhetorical device of hyperbole. He may have been attempting to convey 
to laypersons that police officers must often act or react in mere 
seconds to protect themselves and that the law sometimes shields police 
officers from civil immunity to ensure their maximum efforts at 
protecting the public. 
Humor, including sarcasm, is a well-known tool for teaching adults 
in higher education. In one pair of studies, for example, experimental 
groups of students whose instruction included humor earned higher 
exam scores than students in the control groups, whose instruction 
included no humor.285 These conclusions may have resulted because 
students whose instruction included humor have higher rates of 
information recall than students whose instruction was traditional.286 
Anecdotally, sarcasm in instruction allows a teacher to convey a point 
to both an individual student and a group of onlookers (a class of 
students; in the Venable Case, the other commenters in the Facebook 
discussion) without more hostile or confrontational tactics.287 
Furthermore, researchers have theorized that, when an educational 
exchange involves speakers whose primary languages are different, the 
lack of “sociocultural knowledge” of one party makes the joke a puzzle, 
and that the process of solving it, developing the lacked sociocultural 
knowledge, aids permanent understanding (even if it renders the joke 
unfunny).288 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
283 See Greg Lukianoff, Twitter, Hate Speech, and the Costs of Keeping Quiet, CNET 
(Apr. 7, 2013, 4:00 AM), https://cnet.co/2F7UCqf (“The idea that society achieves 
something positive by mandating that people with bad opinions must hide them . . . can be 
dangerous. . . . [M]aking bigoted speech [effectively] illegal . . . can create an overly rosy 
picture of public sentiment, thus preventing real and festering social problems from being 
addressed.”); supra Part IV Section A. 
284 Venable Decommissioned, supra note 14. 
285 See generally Avner Ziv, Teaching and Learning with Humor, 57 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
EDUC. 5 (1988). 
286 R.L. Garner, Humor in Pedagogy, 54 C. TEACHING 177, 179 (2006). 
287 See David Sudol, Dangers of Classroom Humor, 70 ENGLISH J. 26, 28 (1981). 
288 See Douglas Wulf, A Humor Competence Curriculum, 44 TESOL Q. 155, 159 
(2010). “Much humor is lost once a joke is explained,” but it is still explained, closing the 
information gap between the speaker and the listener. Id. 
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Similarly, civilians without police experience effectively speak a 
different “language” than police officers. Most people do not 
understand the doctrine of qualified immunity and how it relates to 
police officers’ use of force,289 because most people do not have legal 
training or practical police experience.290 Although Venable was 
concededly undiplomatic in his delivery, it is incorrect to think that his 
comment had no social value whatsoever. It was a window into how 
some police officers think about their duties and, more importantly, 
how they think about the constant criticism they endure from people 
without law enforcement experience or legal training. If Venable’s 
comment prompted anyone who read it to try to learn more about 
qualified immunity, then it resulted in a social good. The law should 
not permit governmental employers to prevent these kinds of 
information exchanges by chilling public employee speech under the 
threat of termination. 
As a prudential matter, firing is an extreme remedy that, as here, 
deprives the municipality and the people it serves the opportunity to 
counsel an employee’s lapse in personal judgment or correct the 
behavior of a decorated officer whose service record unquestionably 
demonstrates his high value to the community. Are the people of 
Nashville better off without Anthony Venable on the police force? We 
may never know. Applying the Venable Rule would deter 
municipalities from reaching first for the incredibly harsh tool of 
employment termination when less restrictive means like counseling 
(formal or informal) may be available. Metro, however, was also 
between a proverbial rock and a hard place, politically speaking, in the 
Venable Case. 
289 Cf. Radley Balko, What Is “Qualified Immunity,” and How Does It Work?, WASH. 
POST (July 14, 2015), https://wapo.st/2FaHTDn. 
290 There were just over 600,000 lawyers in the United States in 2017. U.S. DEP’T 
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, 
MAY 2017: 23-1011 LAWYERS, http://bit.ly/2F9VD1k (last updated Mar. 30, 2018). 
Similarly, there were just over 660,000 police officers in the United States in 2017. U.S. 
DEP’T LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND 
WAGES, MAY 2017: 33-3051 POLICE AND SHERIFF’S PATROL OFFICERS, 
http://bit.ly/2F8Yh7r (last modified Mar. 30, 2018). By contrast, there are over 320 million 
people in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. AND WORLD POPULATION CLOCK, 
http://bit.ly/2FaI29T (last visited May 28, 2018). Many lawyers receive training on 
immunity doctrines in law school. Police departments also train officers on best practices to 
preserve immunities in certain situations. See Mr. Graham and the Reasonable Man, MORE 
PERFECT (Nov. 30, 2017) (downloaded using iTunes). 
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4. Political Considerations—and Why They Are Irrelevant
People who work in supervisory roles in government are sensitive to
the way the public perceives them and the jobs they do. For example, 
whatever other issues there may have been with either Marvin 
Pickering’s or Fred Doyle’s performance on the job, their school 
district employers did not fire either of them until both uttered 
messages that neither employer could control.291 Similarly, former 
New Orleans DA Harry Connick worried about what the media’s 
reaction to Sheila Myers’s survey would be if the results had become 
public.292 
Charitably, Metro’s decision to fire Venable reflected a practical 
political calculation when it faced a Hobson’s choice.293 On one hand, 
decision makers risked exposing themselves to liability (whether 
liability for a hostile work environment for failing to remediate the 
arguably discriminatory conduct of a subordinate employee or § 1983 
liability for encroaching on an employee’s speech rights). On the other, 
Chief Anderson and former Mayor Megan Barry risked suffering 
political blowback, and possibly violence against other Metro police 
officers, if embarrassing news of Venable’s comment later leaked from 
the department to the public, and Metro had failed to respond to it 
proactively. Both were bad alternatives. By firing Venable, Metro 
minimized these risks. Even if Venable filed a lawsuit,294 he would be 
an unsympathetic plaintiff because other examples of first responders 
using bad judgment online abound.295 
291 Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1977) 
(call to a radio station); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 566, 568–69 (1968) (letter 
to the editor of a local newspaper). 
292 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). 
293 A Hobson’s choice is one in which a person must choose between two equally bad 
alternatives. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 466 (4th ed. 2016). 
294 Venable has, in fact, retained counsel and sued Metro. Adam Tamburin, Former 
Police Officer Fired for “Inflammatory” Remarks About a Cop Who Shot a Black Man Is 
Suing, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 14, 2018, 7:20 PM), http://bit.ly/2TEpxUl. The complaint alleges 
violations of Venable’s free speech, due process, and equal protection rights pursuant to 
§ 1983. See Complaint at 1–2, 13–17, Venable v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, No. 3:18-cv-
00148 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 13, 2018).
295 See, e.g., Daniel Connolly & Yolanda Jones, Shelby County Sheriff’s Spokesman 
Suspended over Comments on Immigrant’s Arrests, COM. APPEAL (Sept. 25, 
2017, 5:53 PM), http://bit.ly/2TBOX4C; Ron Maxey, Firefighter Relieved of Duty, 
Apologizes, After Saying NFL, NBA Athletes Should Be Shot in Head if They Protest, COM. 
APPEAL (Sept. 26, 2017, 9:34 a.m.), http://bit.ly/2Txw0QT; Blake Montgomery, We Regret 
to Inform You That One of the Hot Florida Cops Has Milkshake-Ducked, BUZZFEED (Sept. 
14, 2017, 6:18 PM), http://bit.ly/2F7VpaH; Fire Chief Removed from Post after Racial Slur 
Directed at Tomlin, WPXI NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017, 5:45 PM), http://bit.ly/2Fcdkxj. 
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One cannot overlook or excuse Metro’s decision to issue a press 
release that prompted the very news coverage that purportedly created 
a workplace disruption that could be used to defend against a public 
employment retaliation claim under the prevailing free-speech tests. 
The existential threat of political blowback does not justify a 
municipality or any of its agents summarily violating an employee’s 
free-speech rights. Shielding all employees from the threat of physical 
violence that might result from a lone employee’s offensive speech 
offers a more compelling case, especially at a time when municipalities 
across the country wrestle with questions about the appropriate use of 
force in police encounters with racial minorities, and some protests lead 
to actual violence. A municipal employer ought to be able to pierce the 
Free Speech Clause and fire an employee if it meets its burden of 
establishing that the employee’s speech actually caused a workplace 
disruption that actually inhibited the municipality’s ability to 
efficiently deliver services to the public, or that the employee’s speech 
actually endangered other employees, as demonstrated by actual proof 
in the record. There is no need to modify the Pickering-Myers 
balancing framework to figure out when the Constitution permits such 
a termination. Rather, the Venable Rule holds municipalities 
accountable for a very specific kind of rights violation, which appears 
to have occurred in the Venable Case. It would deny municipalities the 
cover of the Pickering-Myers balance when the municipal employer’s 
zealous proactivity, not the initial utterance standing alone, created the 
threat of political blowback or violence to other employees. 
F. The Venable Rule Is a Versatile Rule
This Article has thus far analyzed free-speech jurisprudence in the 
context of § 1983 retaliation claims, which only remediates 
constitutional violations from actions under color of state law. To limit 
the application of the Venable Rule to § 1983 employment retaliation 
claims alone, however, would sell it short of its promise. There are two 
other contexts in which Article III courts adjudicate constitutional 
violations where the Venable Rule would be useful: judicial review of 
agency actions and Bivens cases. The next two subsections set forth 
these frameworks and demonstrate how courts might apply the Venable 
Rule in these other contexts. 
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1. Federal Administrative Law
The Venable Rule would also be useful in adjudicating the
constitutionality of the termination of a federal employee who, like 
Venable, posted a crude or racially insensitive comment on a Facebook 
thread. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) issued guidance 
in 2014 that set forth rules for agency employees’ personal use of social 
media.296 Like Metro’s policy, the DOJ guidance vaguely discourages 
speech on “matters affecting the Department,” and it encourages 
federal employees to ask themselves, “Might my use of social media 
adversely affect the Department’s mission?”297 The guidance also 
expressly prohibits “comments that can be perceived as showing 
prejudice based on race, gender, sexual orientation or any other 
protected basis,” even on the employee’s personal social media 
accounts during their personal time.298 The guidance sets forth the 
DOJ’s rationale for this restriction, which should now seem familiar to 
readers: 
It is critically important that Department employees act, and are 
perceived to act by the public we serve, in a fair, just, and unbiased 
manner. Online comments by Department employees exhibiting 
animus based on any protected basis, including race, gender, or 
sexual orientation, that adversely affect our ability to carry out our 
important mission will not be tolerated. . . .  
. . . . 
Department employees do not surrender their First Amendment 
rights as a result of their employment; however, the Supreme Court 
and lower courts have held that the Government may restrict speech 
of its employees when employees are not speaking as private citizens 
on matters of public concern or when the Government’s interest in 
the efficient provision of services outweighs its employees’ interest 
in the speech.299 
The DOJ’s guidance thus puts its employees on notice of the Pickering-
Myers balancing tests with respect to their personal use of social media. 
Former Deputy Attorney General James Cole may have diligently 
drafted this guidance, but the Pickering-Myers test still fails to provide 
concrete answers in a federal analog to the Venable Case. For example, 
what happens when a deputy attorney general sends a press release to 
296 See generally Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to All Department Employees (Mar. 24, 2014), http://bit.ly/2F8Yw2l. 
297 Id. at 1. 
298 Id. at 2. 
299 Id. 
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the Washington Post about an assistant U.S. attorney’s offensive online 
speech, uttered on her own time on a personal social network, which 
no one—at least not enough people to give rise to a disruption that 
interferes with the DOJ’s mission—may have heard about otherwise? 
Just as Metro did likewise in the Venable Case, this practice would 
unfairly tip the Pickering-Myers balance in the government’s favor by 
creating the very interference with government operations that would 
legitimize the firing, even though the disruption may never have 
occurred organically. 
If and when a terminated federal employee seeks judicial review of 
an agency order terminating her employment,300 the reviewing court 
should exercise its authority pursuant to the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA) to determine whether the firing passes constitutional 
muster.301 To make this constitutional determination, this Article 
argues that after applying the two-pronged Pickering-Myers test, 
reviewing courts should apply the Venable Rule and both require the 
employer to prove that the speech actually disrupted agency operations 
and allow a plaintiff to rebut the employer’s disruption evidence, 
because the prevailing Pickering-Myers balancing test fails to account 
for the conduct of government employers who create the disruption that 
they later invoke to retroactively sanitize de facto censorship. Given 
the still-growing pervasiveness of social media, and the promulgation 
of policies at all levels of government that try to curb certain kinds of 
speech on digital platforms, it seems almost inevitable that an 
300 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 created a number of administrative forums for 
challenging an alleged wrongful termination. Of relevance here, the quasi-judicial Merit 
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has statutory authority under federal law to entertain 
wrongful termination grievances that arise from federal employment discrimination based 
on “conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or . . . others.” 
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (2012). Assuming one could shoehorn an inappropriate social media 
comment in violation of DOJ’s 2014 guidance into the ambit of this provision, a terminated 
federal employee could bring a wrongful termination claim before the MSPB. The final 
decisions of the MSPB, however, are subject to review in federal appellate courts, which 
Congress vested with authority to “set aside any action . . . found to be . . . not in accordance 
with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)–(c)(1) (2012). 
301 The APA provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute,” as is the case 
with final determinations of the MSPB, see 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b), “and final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” which would ostensibly be the case 
where there was nothing procedurally defective about an MSPB adjudication, “are subject 
to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). The APA further sets forth the scope of this 
judicial review, including, significantly, empowering a reviewing court to “hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
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analogous case will arise in the federal employment context. Thus, 
courts should also adopt the Venable Rule in the appropriate federal 
public employment retaliation case to fill the gap in the Pickering-
Myers test. 
If the terminated assistant U.S. attorney’s petition for judicial review 
of a DOJ firing pursuant to this guidance failed for some reason, she 
would not necessarily be without any recourse. She may be able to 
pursue a Bivens claim, which the next subsection explains. 
2. Bivens Claims
Section 1983 is a postbellum statute that provides a federal cause of
action for employment retaliation plaintiffs when someone acting 
under color of state law violates their civil rights and liberties.302 
Congress has never enacted legislation to provide the same kind of civil 
rights protections against persons acting under federal law.303 
Nevertheless, a Bivens claim is a “federal analog” to § 1983,304 and 
courts use the tests established in the jurisprudence of each 
interchangeably.305 The Free Speech Clause analysis in this Article 
could thus apply equally, in theory, to a Bivens claim where a federal 
employer violates an employee’s civil liberties. 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics,306 federal law enforcement agents raided Webster Bivens’s 
Brooklyn apartment without a warrant.307 They tossed every room, 
looking for evidence of drug crimes, and shackled Mr. Bivens in front 
of his family, whom they also threatened to arrest.308 Agents then took 
him into custody, interrogated him, and strip-searched him.309 Mr. 
Bivens filed a federal lawsuit alleging violations of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and seeking $15,000 in noneconomic damages from 
each agent for the dignitary harms he suffered, but the district court 
302 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also supra Part II Section A. 
303 See BARBARA A. KRITCHEVSKY, CIVIL RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 12 (2017) (on file with author) (“What would become of Bivens 
if Congress passed an equivalent of section 1983 applicable to federal officials?”). 
304 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). 
305 Doe v. Dist. of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“The bodies of law 
relating to [§ 1983 and Bivens] have been assimilated in most . . . respects.”); see also id. at 
1123 n.18 (collecting cases that apply the same legal standards in both types of cases). 
306 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
307 Id. at 389. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
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dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.310 The Second 
Circuit affirmed.311 
On appeal, the Government argued that Mr. Bivens’s only remedy 
was to file a state tort action for damages arising from the violation of 
his right to privacy, but this argument did not persuade the Court, which 
was reluctant to treat the dispute as “between two private citizens.”312 
Rather, it was precisely because the law enforcement agents were 
cloaked in the authority of the United States, and because the Fourth 
Amendment constrains governmental power in all jurisdictions, that 
the Court was willing to entertain Mr. Bivens’s petition for 
certiorari.313 Analogizing to federal statutes that provide a “general” 
right of action to sue for redress of certain harms, and observing that 
Congress had not enacted a statute foreclosing jurisdiction or relief of 
the kind or on the basis that Mr. Bivens sought, Justice Brennan wrote 
that Mr. Bivens was entitled to sue the agents for damages (or any other 
remedy that federal courts have inherent authority to provide) “if he 
can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal 
agents of his Fourth Amendment rights.”314 The Court read an implied 
right of action in the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he very essence 
of civil liberty consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”315 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan added support for 
the majority’s conclusion that federal courts could imply rights of 
action and fashion remedies for federal constitutional violations. He 
observed that federal courts had long provided injunctive and other 
equitable relief in federal cases alleging constitutional violations 
without particular statutory authorization from Congress.316 He 
reasoned that, if courts could imply rights of action and provide 
equitable relief in federal constitutional cases without an express 
pronouncement from Congress, then the federal courts could also imply 
rights of action and provide compensatory damages in federal 
constitutional cases.317 Perhaps most stringently, Justice Harlan argued 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 389–90. 
312 Id. at 390–92. 
313 Id. at 392. 
314 Id. at 396–97. 
315 Id. at 397 (internal quotation omitted). 
316 Id. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
317 See id. at 405. 
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that “it is apparent that some form of damages is the only possible 
remedy for someone in Bivens’ alleged position,” and that equitable 
relief, like an injunction, would offer little protection against a surprise 
drug raid that had already happened.318 Likewise, the exclusionary rule 
would only bar introduction of evidence obtained in the raid from the 
prosecution’s case in chief; it would not compensate Mr. Bivens or his 
family for the dignitary harms they suffered—“For people in Bivens’ 
shoes,” wrote Justice Harlan, “it is damages or nothing.”319 And while 
he rejected Justice Black’s argument that implying federal rights of 
action in constitutional provisions would open the floodgates of 
litigation and strain scarce judicial resources,320 Justice Harlan argued 
that even if litigation of this kind strains judicial resources, it is worth 
expending those resources to safeguard the Constitution’s promises.321 
The primary takeaway from Bivens, then, is that federal courts can 
imply individual rights of action and provide suitable remedies for 
federal actors’ violations of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, provided 
that there is no alternative remedy available to the plaintiff, and there 
are no “special factors counselling hesitation” in the absence of such 
an alternative remedy.322 Since Congress has not provided a statutory 
or administrative scheme, or expressed a legislative preference or 
finding, that offers countervailing public policy or separation-of-
powers reasons to decline fashioning a judicial remedy for federal 
violations of the Free Speech Clause, employment retaliation litigants 
should be able to petition federal courts for relief using the Bivens 
claim. 
As of this writing, there appear to be no reported Bivens cases 
asserting a federal employment retaliation theory for an alleged free 
speech violation, so it is difficult to determine under what factual 
circumstances a federal court would permit a terminated federal 
employee to imply a right of action for speech-based employment 
318 See id. at 409–10. 
319 See id. at 410. 
320 Id. at 428–29 (Black, J., dissenting). 
321 Id. at 410–11 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
322 Id. at 396 (majority opinion). Conversely, where Congress or the States do provide 
an alternative remedial scheme, the federal courts should dismiss Bivens actions for failure 
to state claims out of respect for separation of powers. See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 
369, 373–77 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (declining to permit a Bivens claim in a suit by former Navy 
and Marine Corps servicewomen, who alleged that they were raped and sexually harassed 
by male counterparts and then fired in retaliation for complaining about their mistreatment, 
because it invited the judiciary to intrude on military affairs and violate the separation of 
powers). 
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retaliation.323 But despite its reluctance to expand Bivens to new 
contexts, the Court has never foreclosed on the possibility that Bivens 
applies to free speech claims.324 Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
“assumed without deciding” that First Amendment claims are 
actionable under Bivens.325 If given the chance to adjudicate an 
appropriate test case pursuant to Bivens, federal courts should adopt 
and apply the Venable Rule. 
First, pursuant to Bivens, a court would imply a federal right of 
action under the stringent language of the First Amendment.326 
Without this protection, it would be “damages or nothing” for the 
terminated employee.327 Then, since federal employers have a similar 
interest in efficiently delivering services to the public, as do municipal 
employers, the court would next apply the Pickering-Myers balancing 
test. In so doing, the court would also apply the Venable Rule and give 
the terminated federal employee an opportunity to rebut any evidence 
323 But see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (declining to create an independent 
federal cause of action for damages pursuant to Bivens when NASA reduced the pay of one 
of its aeronautic engineers who made critical public statements about the agency). Yet the 
Court decided Bush on its unique facts: Congress had provided an express administrative 
remedial scheme in the organic statute, so the Court exercised restraint in declining to imply 
a separate federal cause of action in the case pursuant to Bivens. HOWARD P. FINK, ET AL., 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 21ST CENTURY: CASES AND MATERIALS 296 (4th ed. 2013). 
So while there is a dearth of reported cases on point, the Court did not foreclose free speech 
claims pursuant to Bivens. See id. 
324 Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia, however, have at least twice argued 
against the expansion of cognizable constitutional claims in Bivens actions. See Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537. 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 
Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Thomas, J., and Scalia, J., 
concurring)). Indeed, the Court has been reluctant for several decades to expand Bivens. See 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“Given the notable change in the Court’s 
approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that 
expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity. This is in accord with 
the Court’s observation that it has ‘consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context 
or new category of defendants.’ Indeed, the Court has refused to do so for the past 30 years.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
325 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (assuming that respondents’ 
Free Exercise Clause claim was actionable under Bivens because “[p]etitioners do not press” 
a contradictory argument); Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014) (“[W]e have several times 
assumed without deciding that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims. . . . We do so 
again in this case.”); Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 n.4 (2012) (“We need not 
(and do not) decide here whether Bivens extends to First Amendment retaliatory arrest 
claims.”). 
326 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). The Constitution’s 
use of the words “shall make no law” should help a court disabuse itself of any notion that 
there are “special factors counselling hesitation” in the protection of speech rights. 
327 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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of workplace disruption that the United States offered to justify its 
decision to terminate the employee. (The lone federal defendant against 
whom the Venable Rule would be completely useless, however, is the 
sitting President of the United States.328) 
CONCLUSION 
In his letter to Venable, Chief Anderson posited, in essence, that 
Metro should be able to fire officers for just about anything with 
impunity, as long as some member of the public expresses outrage 
about it. This is not hyperbole: he wrote, “at any time any action you 
might take as a Metropolitan Nashville Police Officer that receives any 
public notice, these readily and instantly retrievable publications” can 
give rise to lawful, retaliatory public employment termination.329 The 
potential import of this legal position is breathtakingly alarming 
because this reasoning could permit all sorts of civil rights abuses. For 
example, a motivated racist who attained public office could, simply 
by issuing a press release and shouting “workplace disruption,” punish 
minority police officers who express support for a Black Lives Matter 
rally. Therefore, filling the gap in § 1983’s free speech jurisprudence 
with the Venable Rule should be of paramount importance to the courts 
because it will enable them to mitigate the risk of this kind of injury by 
protecting the rights of employee-speakers while ensuring that 
municipalities can manage their workforces and retain talented 
employees, whose conduct exhibits a mere judgmental misstep.  
The Venable Rule requires proof of an actual disruption in the 
workplace and a factual determination as to whether the initial speaker 
or the employer republishing the offensive speech caused that 
disruption. Until the federal courts modify their approach to speech-
based public-employment retaliation claims, the Free Speech Clause 
328 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (holding that presidents have absolute civil 
immunity for their official acts undertaken while in office). This issue belies that an Article 
III court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over some cases arising from the president’s 
decision to fire an executive branch employee in retaliation for disfavored speech, deciding 
that the case involves a nonjusticiable political question. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 
228, 242 (1979) (“At least in the absence of ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department,’ we presume that justiciable 
constitutional rights are to be enforced through the courts.” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 217 (1962))). The Court’s interpretation of Article II’s Take Care Clause with respect 
to the president’s near-absolute constitutional authority to fire executive branch employees 
is very well defined. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and its 
progeny. 
329 Anderson Letter, supra note 21, at 5 (emphasis added). 
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itself—one of the most hallowed passages in our Constitution—hangs 
in the balance. 
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